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ABSTRACT
Since the mid-1970s the British Labour Party has embarked
upon a series of journeys up and down the nation's political
spectrum.
The central focus of this study is a survey of
these changes in direction, and an explanation of why these
movements occurred. The question posed is, what motivated the
party to move further to the left of the spectrum than ever
before, only to embark on a return trip which has given the
party the most right-wing policy stances of its history?
To achieve this examination the paper uses the Downsian1
theory of political parties as its starting point.
Downs
argues that in a two-party system parties will move only to
the political center, because here electoral success is most
likely.
Labour's move to the left disproves this.
The
explanation for the move is found in an examination of the
party's internal factions. They compete for control of the
party's institutions and pull the party's position towards
their own ideological stance. Although the party's return to
the center in the late 1980s might have suggested a Downsian
strategy, it is in fact explained by factional influence and
Labour's response to a Conservative agenda.
The result of
reforms, instigated by party leader Neil Kinnock, was to move
the party towards the center but it never set out with a
Downsian objective.
The study is closely tied to Labour's electoral fortunes.
It explains why the party appeared first to adopt positions
which guaranteed defeat, but then went on to sacrifice long
held principles in the search for electoral success.
The study reaches conclusions on two levels. Firstly, it
presents the Dual Advisory Theory, which goes a long way in
explaining the factional battles which shifted the party's
position during the late 1970s and 1980s. It then brings the
party's history up to date with its defeat in the 1992 general
election and the selection of a new leader. By reviewing the
evidence from the 1980s and the party's continued electoral
failure, it ends by concluding that further radical reforms
are vital. Without them the party may struggle to survive in
its present form after the next general election.

1See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy.
York: Harper and Row, 1957.
v

New

WHICH WAY NOW?
An examination of the ideological movement of the
British Labour Party between 1974 and 1992

CHAPTER I

THE MOTIVATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Having been heavily defeated in the general election of
1979, the British Labour Party undertook a series of radical
policy reforms which placed them on the left extreme of the
nations political spectrum.

The Socialists made a rapid move

away from the consensus politics which had been dominant in
post-war Britain.
In 1983, the Conservative Party secured a record-breaking
election success.1 Labour's policy changes had been suicidal.
The result led to conclusions that the party was out of touch
with the predominant views of the British electorate.

The

appearance was that Labour knowingly adopted a position which
guaranteed electoral failure.

A move away from the center was

regarded as a precursor of electoral defeat.
party's shift in the early 1980s be explained?

How can the
Do parties

have more complex goals than simply the securing of office and
the

power

and

prestige

which

accompanies

it?2

Other

1The Conservatives collected 42.9% of the popular vote
and won 379 seats in the House of Commons. Labour, the second
largest party secured only 27.6% and 209 seats. The result
left the Tories with a 144 seat majority over all other
parties, a record in post-war Britain.
2 The best argument set out in favor of the view that
politicians act purely out of self interest when seeking
election, wanting only the power and prestige of office, comes
from David Mayhew in Congress; The Electoral Connection. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.
2

3

priorities may well

exist,

such as

ideologically driven

policies, or the desire of some for power within the party
unit itself.
This
parties.

chapter

explores

the

motivation

of

political

To do this it considers the classic Downsian3 model

of party competition which sees parties as purely electorally
motivated.

It then goes on to examine problems which exist

with the Downsian model,

and concludes by presenting an

alternative approach to the study of party strategy.
The Downsian Theory of Party Competition.
In his classic work, An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Anthony Downs constructs a model to explain the behavior of
political

parties.

motivation,

In relation to this

study of party

three central propositions can be drawn from

Down's analysis: his development of the spatial model of party
competition,

his

vote

seeking

hypothesis

and

his

identification of parties as unified teams4.
1: Spatial Model of Party Competition.5

As
spatial

early

analysis

as
of

1929,

Harold Hotelling

political

parties,

constructed

which

was

a

later

3 Anthony Downs An Economic Theory of Democracy. New
York: Harper and Row, 1957.
4 Downs, chapters 9 and 10.
5 This is also known as the median voter theorem, i.e.
parties converge on the position of the median voter.
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developed by Arthur Smithies.6

It was Downs, though, who

first popularized the model which centers on the construction
of a single dimensional, left-right political spectrum. The
greater the distance a location is from the center, the more
extreme a left or right- wing position is.

Downs argues that

voters are able to locate parties upon the spectrum,

and

consequently support the party closest to their own position.
Parties

are

said

to

be

ideologically

mobile

along

the

spectrum, and able to adjust their viewpoints to reflect the
vote maximizing position.
is vote maximization,

As the overriding goal of parties

they are happy to sacrifice their

ideologies to reflect the position where maximum support
exists.
From

this,

assuming

the

electorate

is

normally

distributed along the continuum, Downs concludes that in a
two-party system party ideologies will converge.
increasingly

mirror

each

other

in

terms

of

Parties will
ideological

position, as they, "deliberately change their platforms so
that they resemble one another."7
together,

As party ideologies come

"if the distribution of ideology in a society's

citizenry remains constant,"8 the result will be each party's

6 See H.Hotelling, "Stability in Competition," The
Economic Journal. Vol.39 (1929), pp.41-57 and A.Smithies,
"Optimum Location in Spatial Competition," The Journal of
Political Economy. Vol.49 (1941), pp.423-439.
7 Downs, p.115.
8 Ibid.
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arrival at the political equilibrium.
Assuming that voter distribution is concentrated at the
center, with the greatest number at 50 on a 0-100 left-right
scale, both parties will converge on this center.

While

parties may risk alienation of voters on their extreme, the
move to the center is not halted.

The number of votes to be

lost on the extreme is only minimal when compared with those
to be gained in the middle.

This equilibrium may not be at

the exact center of a left-right political spectrum, but a
vote maximizing position will exist in any two-party system.
How

far

left

or right this position

"skewdness of the system."9

is depends

on the

Only when voters' preferences

are, "distributed so that voters are massed bimodally near the
extremes,"10 will the parties remain poles apart in terms of
ideology.
2: Vote Seeking Hypothesis.

As his conclusion to An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Downs presents a series of "specific testable hypothesis."11
His first such hypothesis is that, "party members have as
their chief motivation the desire to obtain the intrinsic
rewards of holding office; therefore they formulate policies
as a means to holding office rather than seeking office in

9 See David Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition.
London: John Wiley and Sons, 1976, p.29.
10 Downs, p. 118.
11 Ibid. , pp.296-300.
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order to carry out preconceived policies.1,12
Downs' posits that the primary motivation for seekers of
elected office is personal power.
adapted,

Ideology and policy can be

keeping the party at the political center.

For

Downs, policies are formed purely as an aid to election, not
with

the goal

of policy

implementation

once

in office.

Similarly, an ideology is one of several electoral tools,
formed as information economizing devices to appeal to voters.
The result

of such motivations

political optimum.

is party pursuit

of the

As policy and ideology are electorally

driven, they are manipulated in order to win votes.
3: Parties United.

Downs perceives parties as single units.

Leaders and

members, in his theory, act as one in the pursuit of electoral
success.

Parties are treated as unified teams,

working

together in the pursuit of a single goal— electoral success.
Downsian Theory and Post-War British Politics.
It
Downsian

is

possible

theory to

to

relate

events

the

previously

in post-war

explained

British politics.

Taking the period from 1945 to the early 1970s,

evidence is

found of party behavior reflecting the Downsian model.

During

this period the two main parties appeared to take turns in
redefining their ideological positions, ensuring that both
remained in the best possible position for electoral success.
As the Labour Party swept to power
12 Ibid. , p.296.

in the general
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election of 1945, it was their policy finger placed firmly on
the political

pulse of the nation.

Commitments to the

creation of the welfare state and the national health service,
as well as to a level of full employment, put them at the
center of the new political spectrum.

The majority of a war

weary nation now supported Labour's interventionist policies.
By contrast,

the pre-war Tory "laissez-faire" approach to

government was out of touch.

Collecting only 39% of the

popular vote, down 13.9% on 1935, and 213 seats in the House
of Commons, the Conservatives were devastated.

Their appeal

appeared to be increasingly limited to a minority on the
right.

Although 1945 was only one electoral defeat, the

extent of the Conservatives demise since
questioning the party's future.

1935 left many

Was Britain about to enter a

period of one-party rule?
Had the Tories continued their traditional approach to
government,

rejecting the new direction undertaken by the

Socialists and remaining firmly on the right, the answer may
well have been, yes.

But the Conservatives adapted.13

A

Downsian strategy was pursued, in which the Tories altered
their ideological beliefs in the pursuit of electoral gains.
Accepted were the welfare state, the national health service
and most of nationalization; embraced were full employment and
Keynesian economics.

The result was a Tory return to power in

13 See Ivor Crewe and David Searing, "Ideological Change
in the British Conservative Party." American Political Science
Review. Vol. 82, II, 1988, pp.361-384.
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1951, and a sequence of three consecutive election victories
during that decade. The Conservatives had demonstrated their
own discovery of the new political center in British politics.
For Labour the Tory discovery of the center, meant their
thunder was stolen.

As the Conservatives accepted a new level

of intervention by the national government, the economic boom
of

the

1950s

cast

doubts

over the

Socialist's

economic

strategy.

Their traditional approach, built around public

ownership,

was seen as outdated.

Labour's response came

through its most right-wing leader ever.

Hugh Gaitskell led

his party through its own series of internal reforms, ensuring
Labour's

policy

reflected

the

European economics were taking.

capitalist

direction

west

The mixed economy became the

core of Labour's economic strategy.

While the Clause Four14

commitment to public ownership of industry remained, specific
nationalization

proposals

renationalization of steel.

were

limited

to

the

By the time of the 1964 election,

Labour had rejoined the Conservatives at the political center.

The

era

of

'Butskellism'15 had

arrived,

and

little

14 The Labour Party constitution, in Clause Four, states
that the party holds an overriding commitment to the public
ownership of industry. In government the party should always
act to carry out this principle, if the constitution is to be
strictly adhered to.
15 'Butskellism' was named for the Conservative Chancellor
Rab Butler and Hugh Gaitskell, due to the mirroring of their
policies. This was also known as the "Westminster" model of
government, so named by Samuel Beer.

9

seemed to distinguish the two parties approach to the economy.
With economic prosperity being the number one priority of all
governments, both parties enjoyed the cozy Phillip's curve
trade off between inflation and unemployment.

Both employed

the Keynesian strategy of tinkering with the economy at the
macro

level,

producing

short-term

economic

gains.

The

differences between the two were largely regarded as ones of
personality.
center,

both

Comfortably straddling the perceived political
enjoyed

an

acceptable

degree

of

electoral

success.
A definite case can be made that this period of British
politics neatly fits the Downsian model,
reached for the center of the spectrum.

as both parties

If the three Downsian

propositions introduced earlier are considered specifically in
relation to post-war Britain, further support is found.
Is Spatial Model of Party Competition.
In the search for electoral success both parties
appeared to move to the center.
position was

perceived.

An optimum vote collecting

Labour's policies

and

ideology

reflected a moderate left position, while the Conservatives
took the moderate right.
often

ambiguous

over

As Downs theorized, the parties were
policy

positions,

only

identifying

themselves on the spectrum through minimal efforts to please
their extremes. Downs explains,

"this may in fact be the only

way to tell the two parties apart ideologically, since most of
their policies are conglomerated in an overlapping mass in the
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middle of the scale."16
2: Vote Seeking Hypothesis.
In relation to the premise that the goal of political
parties is vote maximization, a mirroring of the Downsian
theory is seen again.
a

principle

goal

of

No political observer would deny that
all

major

political

operating under a democratic system,

parties,

when

is to secure office.

However, this period of British politics fits the Downsian
model

perfectly due to the

occurred.

ideological

adaptation which

After Labour's success in 1945, a majority in the

Tory party found a new social conscience, while from 1948
onwards

Labour's

ties

with

pure

socialism

economic ownership were increasingly severed.

and

national

Ideological

sacrifices were clearly being made by both parties to move
them to the political center and ensure continued electoral
dividends.

Electoral success was a priority, as opposed to

ideological purity.
3: Parties United
While in reality parties can never be as uniform as the
Downsian model suggests, both the Conservatives and Labour
kept internal disputes to a minimum during the 1950s and
1960s.

Divisions within the Tories were always kept inside

the party hierarchy and not publicized.

Labour did fight some

public battles in the late 1950s, but these were more of

16 Downs, p. 135.
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personality than policy substance.17
Evidence supporting the Downsian model is unquestionably
in existence during this period.
a

simple

explanation

The model appears to offer

of the motivation

political parties in post-war Britain.
simply the control of parliament.

and behavior

of

Their desire was

To do this, they adapted

their policies and ideologies to fit the current mood of the
country.

Conversely, the period since the early 1970s has

demonstrated the behavior of political parties may be far from
being so simple.

Left unexplained by the Downsian model is

the dancing up and down the political spectrum which has
occurred in Britain since the mid-1970s. Mrs.Thatcher dragged
the Conservatives further right than ever before, while the
1Bennites118 took Labour even further towards the opposite
extreme.

It is with these ideological movements of the Labour

Party that this study is concerned.

Why did Labour so clearly

break from the political center, so vital under the Downsian
model,

and assume a position of seeming electoral

self-

destruction? And how, when the party had just undertaken such
a radical move, did Neil Kinnock manage to guide a return to
the center?
The fact that Labour moved along the political spectrum
17 See Ian Bradley Breaking the Mould: The Birth and
Prospects of the Social Democratic Party. Oxford: Robertson,
1981.
18 The 'Bennites' is a name given to a large number of
left-wing Labour MPs during the 1970s and 1980s, with former
cabinet minister Tony Benn as a figurehead leader.
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during the 1980s is evidenced by the fluctuation in its policy
positions.

To demonstrate this it is possible to review its

changing manifesto commitments.19

Examined are selected

manifesto pledges made by Labour between 1979 and 1992.20
Chosen are three policy areas: nationalization, taxation and
national health provision.

Each of these can easily be

located on a single dimensional, left-right spectrum.

To

judge the change in policy commitment, both the amount of
manifesto

coverage

and

extremity

of

actual

pledges

are

considered.
1: Nationalization.
Throughout most of the world,

government control of

industry is a policy associated with parties on the left of
the political spectrum.
Party

constitution,

With the construction of the Labour

Clause

Four

established

the

ownership of industry as a primary economic principle.

state
The

level of party commitment to Clause Four has fluctuated during
the post-war period, and significant variations in emphasis
are seen between 1979 and 1992.
In 1979, the manifesto 'The Labour Way is Better for
19 See Robertson,
chapter 4, "The Correlates of
Ideological Change," pp 93-136, which explores party movement
between 1924 and 1966.
In his "A Theory of Party
Competition," David Robertson uses the method of measuring
manifesto pledges to measure changes in party positions.
20 For the manifestos of 1979, 1983 and 1987 I have used
the versions in British General Election Manifestos 1959-1987.
Dartmouth: Parliamentary Research Services, 1990, compiled and
edited by F.W.S. Craig.
For 1992 I used the Labour Party
Publication It's time to get Britain working again.
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Britain, 1 spent only two short paragraphs
document21

of a 20 page

considering the party policy on nationalization.

Contained within the section concerned with the creation of
"Jobs and Prosperity,' Labour promised merely to use "public
ownership to sustain and create new jobs."22
to new nationalization was made.

No commitment

The emphasis given to

private investment was three times greater, a policy at odds
with a socialist strategy of government economic control. In
1983

'The New Hope

policy.

for Britain1 presented a contrasting

"Public and Co-operative Enterprise" is central to

the program for rebuilding industry.

Labour was committed not

only to renationalize what the 1979-83 government privatized,
but

also

to

establish

a,

"significant

public

stake

in

electronics, pharmaceuticals, health equipment and building
materials."23

Detailed proposals were made to allow the

steel industry,
through planned investment, to meet the rising
demand for economic expansion. We will retain the
five major BSC [British Steel Corporation] plants
and see that a larger share of the home market is
met from UK production. A major public presence
will also be established in the steel stock-holding
industry.24
The manifesto also committed to public ownership of the
British

Aerospace

Corporation,

while

21 20 pages as reproduced by Craig.
22 Ibid. , p.288.
23 Ibid. , p. 460.
24 Ibid. , p.356.

pledging

to,

"re

14

establish the British Shipbuilding Corporation as a public
sector company.1'25
1983 therefore represented a definite move to the left
for Labour.
greater,

Not only was the emphasis on nationalization far

but

detailed

policy

commitments

were

made

renationalization and new public ownership projects.

for
This

indicates a return to the party's roots and the commitments of
its constitution.
Although it remained, the commitment to social ownership
in 1987 was far less emphasized.
banner

of

industrial

commitment to

policy,

Placed under the broad

two paragraphs

"take a socially owned stake

industries and other concerns."26

did make

a

in high-tech

While promising to return

utilities such as gas and water to public ownership, gone were
the precise details of government economic control.
"It's time to get Britain working again," published for
the 1992 election, committed a Labour government to its most
right-wing industrial strategy ever.

Two lines only were

given over to nationalization with the pledge,

"We will

restore public control of the National Grid."27

All plans

for

new

areas

of

public

ownership

had

been

abandoned.

Industrial policy was for the first time built around aid to

25 Ibid. , p.356.
26 Ibid. , p. 461.
27 The Labour Party, It's time to get Britain Working
again. London: Labour Party, 1992, p.13.
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the

private

sector.

The

manifesto

explained,

"modern

government has a strategic role, not to replace the market but
to ensure that the market works properly."28

Tax incentives

were to be introduced to aid small businesses and encourage
private

investment.29

Labour had moved back

across

the

political spectrum, further right than ever before. The stark
contrast between the Labour of 1983 and Labour of 1992 is
shown by last years pledge to "proceed with a leasing scheme
of 188 new Network trains on the North Kent line— the first
step

in

securing

private

Britain's railways."30

investment

to

help

modernize

Labour was proposing private control

of state owned British Rail.
2: Taxation.

A redistributive taxation policy
parties of the left.

is synonymous with

Income tax, in Britain, is the most

progressive tax and so tends to be emphasized by a party
looking for a greater level of income redistribution.

In 1979

Labour made no mention of income tax in its manifesto.
six lines on taxation stressed only curtailing evasion.

The
While

a plan did exist to introduce a wealth tax, little emphasis
was given to tax policy and tax increases.
1983's manifesto was not specific about the actual levels
of increase

in income tax,

28 Ibid. , p. 11
29 Ibid. , pp. 12-13.
30 Ibid. , p. 10.

but emphasis on the tax was
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increased.

The platform explained, "Some taxes will have to

be increased, both to shift the tax balance towards those who
can best afford to pay,
programs."31

and to help finance our social

Considering the extensive public expenditure

programs Labour planned, even with its commitment to borrow
funds, income tax levels would have had to be substantially
increased.
A similar policy was presented in 1987, with a proposed
Kinnock government preparing to reverse the two percent cut in
the basic rate of income tax made earlier in the year.

Labour

promised, "the extra tax cuts which the richest 5 per cent
have received from the Tory government,"32 would be reversed
and the money redistributed to the "most needy."

For 1992 a

shift to the right can again be perceived as Labour attempted
to allay fears it they would be a 'tax and spend1 government.
For the first time a specific ceiling of 50% was set for
income tax bands.
3: Health.

Many in the Labour movement regard the creation of the
National Health Service by the Attlee administration, as one
of the greatest achievements of that, or any, government.
Free health care for all is a policy traditionally associated
with the left.
NHS,

but

only

Conservative governments have accepted the
when

31 Craig, p.351.
32 Ibid. , p .460 .

tempered

with

private

insurance.
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Thatcherite policy increasingly looked towards the extension
of private health care.
A priority was made of health in Labour*s 1979 manifesto,
with six paragraphs setting out a detailed policy.33 Opposed
were higher prescription charges, and a target was set for an
end to all charges.

Private health schemes were not attacked,

although a "phasing out" of private beds in the NHS was to
occur.

In 1983 Labour's emphasis on health was further

expanded.

More radical policies were now presented, with an

end to all health charges and the prevention of a further
expansion of the private sector.

The left-wing manifesto

promised that a Labour government would, "take into the NHS
those parts of the profit-making sector which can be put to
good use."34

As with the other policy areas explored above,

1983 sees Labour positioned firmly on the left of the policy
spectrum.
By 1987 the emphasis on health had been cut.
Labour

pledged

to

cut

waiting

lists

and

stop

While
the

"privatization" of the NHS, which the Thatcher government was
accused of, the detailed radical proposals of 1983 were gone.
Although the 1992 manifesto devoted a full two pages (out of
27) to the health issue, the proposals made were not similar
to those in 1983.

Labour attacked the reforms of the Tory

33 Ibid. , p.291.
34 Ibid. , p.365.
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government,

promising

to

end

'opting-out.|35

Major

new

investments were planned but no attacks on private health care
were made.

Labour believed that health was a policy on which

it could score vital political points.

This was to be done

through the exploitation of perceived Conservative weakness,
not Labour's own radicalism.
The exploration of these three policy areas demonstrates
the extent to which Labour's movement along the political
spectrum during the past 13 years has occurred.

In no way has

Labour carried out a continual search for the center ground of
British politics.

While the Kinnock modernization strategy

may have taken what appeared a Downsian path, producing the
party's most right wing policy pledges ever, leaders prior to
this did not.

Downs, at best, appears not to be a truth for

all times.
For Downs, no logic exists for a party not to adopt a
vote maximizing position at all times.

When opinions in the

electorate are stable, with the majority at the center, no
possible motive exists for diversity.

Assuming that the

majority were massed around the center following the period of
party centerism explored earlier, attitudes since then have

35 "Opting out" was a policy developed by the Thatcher
government where hospitals could chose to remove themselves
from the control of the local health authority and become more
financially independent. The opposition attacked this as a
step towards privatizing national health hospitals.
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been largely stable.36

For example,

in 1974 29.5% of the

electorate felt the trade unions had too much power, in 1987
29.1% did.

Over the same period support for welfare increases

rose from 23% to 34%, while the proportion of the electorate
believing in a greater redistribution of income fell from 56%
to 48%.37

Since

1974 the only statistically significant

shift in attitudes has been in favor of greater privatization.
In all other cases attitudes have remained stable.
Downs would ask why the Labour party would rationally
undertake any ideological movement. The answer is that in
reality party decisions are far more complex than suggested by
his model.
1: Spatial Model of Party Competition.
The Downsian model is a single dimensional presentation.
Under this model all policies can be represented on a single
line.

Downs' contention is that voters and parties can locate

all policies in terms of a left-right division.

In reality,

this

toward

may

European
spectrum?

not

be

the

case.38

Can

attitudes

Community be packaged neatly
The

answer

is

no.

on the

Supporters

the

left-right

of

European

integration exist both within the Conservative and Labour
36 See Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell, John Curtice, Geoff
Evans Julia Fields and Sharon Witherspoon, Understanding
Political Change. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991, chapter 11.
37 Figures from Ivor Crewe and Neil Day, The British
Electorate 1963-1987. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1991, chapters 7,8 and 9.
38 Robertson, chapter 5.
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parties, and are proportionately most numerous amongst the
"center" Liberal Democrats.

European union is not a left-

right issue.
To further demonstrate the existence of policies which
cannot be placed on the left-right split we can consider the
work of Crewe and Searing.39

They have constructed a model

which demonstrates that at least two dimensions operated in
British politics during the 1980s. Upon the traditional leftright

political

spectrum

are

found

economic

policies.

However, a second spectrum is also found to be influential in
vote determination— the Authoritarian spectrum.

Here the

range is from a liberal to authoritarian approach to social
policies such as crime and the death penalty. Some voters who
traditionally associate with the left simultaneously related
to the authoritarian Thatcherite approach.

While convergence

of support is possible under a two dimensional model, it is
mathematically impossible for parties to appeal to a majority
if

multiple

existence.40

dimensions

(i.e.

more

than

two)

are

in

As a result, under a multi-dimensional model

many of the propositions made by Downs* are invalidated.

A

simple political center for parties to move to no longer
exists.
While accepting this criticism of the Downsian model, it

39 Crewe and Searing, pp.361-384.
40 See Dennis Mueller, Public
Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Choice

II. New York:

21

is equally important to recognize that the left-right spectrum
dominates modern politics and elections.

The mass media has

a controlling influence on the way politics operates, as they
offer the main source of political information.

As the media

chooses to condense the vast majority of issues on to the
left-right spectrum, the electorate tends to operate in a
similar manner.

Our exploration of the changes in Labour's

policy position over the past 13 years demonstrates this.
Most major issues can be located on the left-right scale.
Parties and politicians are well aware of the significance of
such locations, and while they may attempt to make cross
dimensional appeals, as over the EC, they still perceive a
left-right spectrum along which they are mobile.
If we accept that modern politics is dominated by the
left-right spectrum, Labour's movement away from the center is
still unexplained. Downs' second and third propositions become
central.
2: Vote Seeking Hypothesis.
While not denying that parties desire electoral victory,
Budge and Farlie add "The key questions are how far they are
prepared to alter and adopt their other goals in order to win,
and whether they seek to win under all circumstances."41
a) Ideology: Policies and ideologies are, in reality, far

41 See Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, Voting and Party
Competition-A Theoretical Critigue and Synthesis Applied to
Surveys from Ten Democracies. London: John Wiley and Sons,
1976, p.114.
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more than electoral tools.

As Richard Rose demonstrates in

his study of how election programs in Britain relate to future
spending in government, party programs do define priorities.
His study concludes, "British parties can be assumed to carry
through most of their election priorities into government and
to impose them, at least in a broad sense, upon the state
apparatus."42 Party programs are more than electoral tools.
Further to this, the Crewe and Searing study of the
Conservative
personal

Party

ideology

sacrificed

under Mrs.Thatcher43 demonstrates
on

a

for electoral

political

extreme

need

success.

Although

that

not

Downs'

be
sees

ideology as only a means to gaining office, little support for
the Thatcherite brand of conservatism existed within her own
party during the early 1970s, and even less was found in the
country.

Thatcherism was never designed to move the party

closer to the electorate as a whole. Using survey data from
the 1972-3 period, Crewe and Searing found that only 17% of
the electorate endorsed the core Thatcher ideology of strong
government and free enterprise. When authority was added, (eg
in terms of a strong stance against crime), only 3% shared the
opinions of the Thatcherite band.
motives can be found.
Joseph,

No evidence of Downsian

Thatcher and her chief ally, Sir Keith

"self-consciously

moved

away

from

the

electoral

42 See Richard Rose, Do Parties make a difference? London:
MacMillan, 1984.
43 Crewe and Searing, p.382.

23

center...Joseph’s central theme was the importance of getting
it right rather than getting elected."44
What Mrs.Thatcher wanted to do was shape public opinion
to her way of thinking, rather than adapting her own ideology
to fit that of the general populous.

Although survey data

demonstrates that Mrs. Thatcher failed in this goal,45 she
enjoyed substantial electoral success while being located more
to the extreme of the political spectrum.

Her victories show

that voters determine the direction of their ballots on more
than ideological position.

Competence and perceived success

in government can be vital electoral determinants, regardless
of where parties stand on the left-right spectrum.
Accepting this, it is possible to conclude that rational
politicians may maintain ideological positions which are not
aligned with the political center.

An ideological commitment

may not destroy electoral prospects.

The Labour move to the

left in the early 1980s can be seen as no more irrational than
Mrs.Thatcher1s move to the right.
over ten years.

She went on to govern for

Had Labour been victorious in 1983, and gone

on to govern successfully, their extreme position on the leftright spectrum would have survived far longer.
b)
approval

Party supporters: A strategy designed purely for the
of

voters

may

fail

to

44 Ibid. , p. 374.
45 See Heath et al. chapter 11.

attract

needed

party
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resources.46

Whether in terms of financial

support or

campaigners to get out the vote, a party must appeal to those
willing to sacrifice a higher cost than simply the effort of
voting.

As David Robertson explains, "A policy that has the

approval of a majority of electors may be useless if it cannot
attract enough active supporters to get that potential vote
out."47 Those willing to make such sacrifices tend to be on
the ideological extremes, and so pull the party away from what
may be its most competitive position.
3: Parties Disunited.

Downs excludes the possibility of factionalism amongst
party leaders, but leadership of modern political parties
never emanates as a single voice.

Within one party several

competing groups, with their own aims and interests,
exist.

can

During the 1970s and 1980s such factions within the

Labour Party became institutionalized, and widely reported in
the press.

Labour was anything but a single unified team.

Competition between party elites continued through the 1983
general election, with sectional goals often thwarting those
of the party as a whole.

In the struggle for power within the

party competing elites, "pulled in two [or more] directions at
once,

away

position."48

from
This

and

struggle

46 Robertson, p. 32.
47 Ibid. , p.32.
48 Ibid. , p. 33.

towards

the

for power

competitively
therefore

best

becomes
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central to party behavior, as it is these factions which may
ultimately determine the external direction of a party.
An Alternative Theory of Party Motivation—
The Dual Advisory Theory.
While all major political parties do have as their
primary goal electoral success, to understand the motivation
of parties it needs to be appreciated that they can have other
goals

too.

The

work

of

Przeworski

and

Sprague49 has

established that different ideological directions exist within
a single party structure.
competition for power.

These create divisions and internal
Factions arise and fight for control

of the party's institutions.

While parties may try to fight

as a unified team in external battles, internally they can be
severely divided.

An alternative theory of party motivation

must accept that British parties operate on dual levels—
external and internal adversaries.
External Adversaries.

Downs, along with most political observers, is concerned
with how political parties operate in relation to each other,
as opposed to their internal operations.

This is the external

level of party operations and is centered around electoral
competition.

Both major parties in Britain can, and do,

compete as versions of the unified teams pictured by Downs.
They are not however unified at all times.
49 See Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, Paper Stones-An
Electoral History of Socialism. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1986, chapter 5.
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Party unity is provoked only through self-interest. It is
in the interest of activists to have their party in power.
Until their party controls the levers of power, they have no
hope of exercising influence over the direction of national
policy.

Even if an individual's faction is not dominant

within the party, electoral success is still in his interest.
Only when

the party

is

in office will

influence result in an impact on the nation.

an extension of
Periods of party

unity are therefore likely to occur during the extended period
of the long-campaign50 prior to a general election.

At this

time it is clear to all in the party structure that the
opportunity of power, either defending or securing it, is at
stake. For parliamentary members an added incentive is that
their own seats, and therefore for some their jobs, are on the
line.

The likelihood of great vocal dissension from the

leadership's position is substantially reduced.

At other

times the party in government has a greater tendency to mute
internal division in the defense of its own administration.
Party members are aware that their record in government will
be judged at the following election.

A tendency exists not to

'rock the boat.'

50 William Miller et al in How Voters Change. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990, establish that during a general
election campaign a short and a long campaign take place. The
long campaign can take place for up to 18 months prior to a
ballot as the parties compete to be in the best position for
the short campaign. The short campaign may be as little as
three weeks once the prime-minister has set the date for the
general election.
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Internal Adversaries

Between them, the Labour and Conservative parties cover
the great part of the British political spectrum.
their

'catch-all'51 nature,

they are

Due to

forced to encompass

diverse groups amongst their representatives and activists.
Groups from the far left are teamed with those who are simply
left of center, and the same is true for the right of the
spectrum.

Complete

ideological

and

policy

unity

is

impossible.

Internal party factions, built around differing

beliefs, cannot be avoided.
Control of a party's internal institutions tends to be
shared by a coalition of factions.

A single faction is almost

never strong enough to hold every office within a party's
structure.

The level of influence a faction holds however,

and the emphasis given to their policies, will vary.

Because

of this, internal factions compete for the greatest possible
control over the party's external direction.

Control of the

party apparatus will shift from one faction to another after
a period of continued external party failure.
the

failure

will

determine

the

extent

of

The severity of
the

pressure

competing factions can exert in support of a change in party
direction.

Failure while in government,

such as economic

policy failure, can put pressure on, and create resentment
51 Catch-all was a name given to parties by Otto
Kirchheimer in his study, "The Transformation of the west
European party systems."
From, J.Palambaro and M.Weiner
(eds), Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966.
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towards, the current dominant faction.

A change in factional

control is unlikely during office, however, because unity is
greater during this time and the leadership is in a stronger
position

to

hold

off

challenges.

This

is because

the

additional power accruing to the prime-minister and cabinet
produces dominance.

The prestige that party leader has as

head of government has a tendency to induce "deference amongst
the rank-and-file."52

The cabinet's

influence over the

development of government policy, party unity in defense of
governing record, and the government offices distributed at
the leader's discretion, combine to produce loyalty in the
party as a whole.
Electoral defeat is far more likely to produce a change
in internal influence.

After an external defeat an internal

party post-mortem will be held.

Scape-goats will be found.

Lesser factions are now in a position to elevate themselves to
a primary position.

The severity of the defeat will determine

the extent to which the party changes direction.

If the party

has been defeated on consecutive occasions, but the second
time improved its showing, a second change and reverse in
\

direction may not occur.
Complete changes in direction are rare due to the fact
that a coalition is likely to dominate.
are far more likely.

Changes in emphasis

Dramatic changes will occur only "(1)

52 Patricia Lee Sykes, Loosing from the Inside.
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988, p.17.
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after

a

devastating

electoral

defeat,

[or]

(2)

when

a

victorious opponent*s ideology is thought to be popular.”53
Labour and the Dual Advisory Theory.
An examination of the Labour Party in the post-war period
supports

this

Dual

Advisory

Theory.

Before

looking

specifically at the party*s activities, it is necessary to
consider the constitutional structure of the party, as this
encourages the growth of competing factions.
Constitutional Structure.
The Labour Party operates with a federal structure.
Three power bases exist within the party— the Parliamentary
leadership, the National Executive Committee (NEC), and the
Party Conference.

Dominance in one area guarantees a faction

at least a voice in party affairs; very often control of one
base gives a faction a guiding role in policy-making.
As with the American Constitution, what the Labour Party
Constitution does not say is more important than what it
does.54

Although the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) tends

to dominate external relations, and is the area a faction must
dominate

if

it

is

to

control

external

relations,

the

Constitution does not define who has ultimate supremacy over
policy formation.

Each of the three power bases can be used

to launch policy initiatives.

Even without control of the

53 Crewe and Searing, p.378.
54 See Mclean, in Cook and Taylor (eds) The Labour Party.
London: Longman, 1980, p.35.
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parliamentary leadership, a faction may use an alternative
base to establish

its own policy position and launch a

challenge to the leadership.

A leadership change, producing

a new leader with a fresh policy direction, is often the final
event of an internal faction shift.
1: Parliamentary Leadership

Although only one of three internal power bases, the
parliamentary leadership is in a position to dominate the
direction of policy when in government.

Out of office, the

parliamentary leadership faces far greater challenges.

Policy

resolutions from both Conference and the NEC can be forced
upon it.

When this is carried out by opposing factions, the

leadership historically finds resistance difficult.
The foundation of parliamentary independence from other
party

institutions

was

established

establishing the modern party.
as

the

in

conference

After the party had begun life

Labour Representation Committee,

negotiations

the

it entered

with the Independent Labour Party in 1900.

leaders of the Representation Committee,

into
The

Kier Hardie and

Ramsay MacDonald won agreement "for a distinct Labour Group in
Parliament, who shall have their own whip, and agree upon
their policy."55

The Parliamentary Labour Party was not to

take instructions from the mass membership.

No

Labour

leader has ever taken the view that MPs are responsible to the
mass membership for policy decisions.
55 Ibid. , p.34.

However, leaders have
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varied in their acknowledgement of a definitive role for other
party institutions.

Both Attlee and Gaitskell showed respect

for the role of the conference.

Attlee went as far as to

state, "The Labour Party Conference lays down the policy of
the Party, and issues instructions which must be carried out
by

the

Executive,

representatives

in

the

affiliated

Parliament

and

organizations
local

and

its

authorities."56

Gaitskell demonstrated his acceptance of the conference role
in his reaction to the 1960 vote for unilateralism.

Rather

than ignoring the decision he determined to campaign for its
reversal

at the

following

conference.

Both Wilson

and

Callaghan suffered major defeats of their policy positions at
the hands of conference.

Neither paid much attention.

Their

power in the government allowed them to continue their own
policy approaches.
2: National Executive Committee and Conference.
As the Constitution is silent on the issue, there is
nothing that conference or the NEC can do to enforce their
points of view.

They can, however, be important platforms for

internal voices of dissent.

Not only do both structures

provide for this, but the constitution provides them a role in
the construction of the party manifesto.
Resolutions passed at Conference by a two-thirds majority
become part of the 'Party Program.'

This does not create an

56 C.R. Attlee The Labour Party in Perspective. Gollanez:
London, 1937, p.293.
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automatic commitment to translate the pledge into public
policy, but it is a formal party position.

The electoral

manifesto is constructed by a joint committee of the cabinet,
or shadow cabinet, and the NEC.
Without any constitutionally dominant body, competition
between rival factions is encouraged.

Although one faction

may dominate the parliamentary leadership, opposing factions
can work for influence through the alternative power bases.
Internal conflict over the direction of policy is almost
unavoidable.

Reviewing the behavior of the Labour Party in

the post-war years we find such competition.
For the general election of 1945,

and the following

government,

a moderate/left coalition dominated the party

structure.

Internal dissent was minimal as the party was at

its most popular position ever.

The Attlee administration

carried out the most radical social reforms ever seen in
Britain.
After a narrow victory in 1950, Labour was removed from
office in 1951.
away

from a

Since 1948 the party leadership had pulled

full

socialist

commitment,

such

as

further

nationalization, but it remained by far the most successful
Labour leadership ever.

Although externally defeated, the

party's governing faction was largely unchallenged.

The right

of the party, muted during the previous government,
however see a new direction for Labour.

did,

Following a further

external defeat in 1955, and this time a more substantial one,
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the party entered its revisionist phase.
The

change

of

dominating faction.

party

leader

signalled

a

change

The right of the party was now to

its greatest influence ever.

in

exert

Hugh Gaitskell led the party

through a revision of economic policy which continued to the
Wilson government.
With

the

economic

failure

of

Wilson's

1964-70

administration, pressure on the leadership grew.

External

defeat followed in the general election of 1970, and the
factions

of

the

left

increased

conference and executive level.

their

influence

at

the

Electoral success saved the

moderate/right coalition at the parliamentary level in 1974,
but as the following chapters demonstrate, in the long-term
this only led to greater internal hostility.
The Dual Advisory Theory demonstrates that parties do
indeed move along the left-right ideological spectrum, but not
necessarily in the fashion imagined by Downs.
factional

dominance,

which

is often

A change in

caused by

electoral

failure, creates a change in the overall policy of the party.
As external conflicts continue the party will undertake a new
position, which could be to the left or right of its previous
stance.

Factions

compete continually on the basis

of

ideology for influence within the party structure, and only
when direct electoral competition is present do the parties
tightly unify.
Since 1974 fluctuation of factional control has continued
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inside the Labour Party.

Under the Downsian theory, stability

of attitudes in the electorate during this time would result
in the pursuit of the center ground.

This has not occurred.

Internal factional competition guaranteed that the party was
pulled far to the left, before reforms beginning in the mid1980s brought it back to the very center. The remainder of
this study concentrates on the Labour party's ideological
movements since 1974, demonstrating how internal factions have
played

a

key

role

in

the

party's

direction.

CHAPTER II

THE SEEDS OP DIVISION
Having suffered its worst electoral defeat in the post
war period in the general election of 1979, Labour entered
into a period of public dispute and division.

The turmoil

within the party structure was overwhelmingly clear for all to
see.

The left blamed the moderate leadership for abandoning

socialist principles, while the right attacked the left for
being too extreme.

The internal

factional dispute over

direction was to dominate British party politics for the next
ten years.57

While the division only became publicly clear

after the May 1979 ballot,
electoral post-mortem.

the roots go far beyond this

This chapter explores the origins of

hostility within the party structure, dating back to the first

57Factions within the Labour party can be divided into
five broad categories. The group found on the left extreme of
the party is the "hard left." This group is referred to as
democratic socialist. It believes in the state ownership and
control of industry and the complete redistribution of wealth
and income. Much of their ideology is shared with the former
communist and socialist states of eastern Europe.
The
difference comes in this groups commitment to democracy. To
their right on the party spectrum come first the "soft left,"
then the "center" and then the "soft right." Each of these
three groups believes, to a differing degree, in some state
ownership
and control
of
industry along with
some
redistribution of wealth. On the right of the party is found
the social democratic group.
It tends to give far more
support to free market economics, seeing the government role
as correcting market deficiencies.
35

36

Wilson government of 1964-1970, and the growth of the left
which followed.

The new internal strength of the left was

then confirmed in the 1970-74 period, while Labour was out of
office.

The chapter demonstrates that intra-party disputes

and the growth of the left had already created a party primed
for a change

in factional control,

and a resulting new

direction in external policy, prior to the 1974 elections.

It

concludes that the moderate leadership1s exit was postponed
only by the party*s return to power in 1974.
While governments concern themselves with a wide spectrum
of policy areas,

it is economic policy which tends to be

central to a party's policy platform.

Whether it be national

indicators, such as the level of unemployment and the rate of
inflation,

or

personal

concerns,

such

as

the

rate

of

individual taxation or level of income, the electorate demands
that

the

economy

be

central

to

any

election

campaign.

Correspondingly, when divisive factions exist within one of
the two main

British political

parties,

they

invariably

revolve around the direction of economic policy.
policy

appears

to

fail,

pressure

for

a

new

As one
direction

increases.
The division of Labour from the late 1960s proved no
exception to this.

As the moderate leadership's economic

policies were increasingly judged a failure, opposing factions
established themselves around alternative economic approaches.
While other issues, such as membership of the EEC and the
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question of inter-party democracy, grew to be significant,
economic direction was always central to factional divisions.
For simplicity, the factions can be divided into two
broad groups— those on the hard left who believed in a truly
socialist economic strategy of national ownership and economic
control, and those in the center and on the right who believed
in the pursuit of a mixed economy.
opposing groups

To understand how these

emerged it is necessary to undertake an

examination of Labourfs post-war economic history.
Labour's Economic History.
Although the Labour Party came into office in 1945 with
a

commitment

to

nationalization,

once

the

initial

nationalization program was complete little else was proposed
to influence the internal operation of industry.

Labour

placed its emphasis on full employment, to be achieved through
Keynesian demand management.

This reflected the commitment

Labour had made after the publication of the 1942 Beveridge
Report and the 1944 White Paper on employment.58

The party

set as its primary economic aim the maintenance of a high and
stable level of employment.

The Keynesian solution used to

solve unemployment required no detailed intervention in the
economy at the micro level, but primarily the manipulation of
fiscal policy from the center.

58 Both these war time documents set the maintenance of
a 'high and stable level of employment' in post-war Britain as
the primary economic objective.
The Labour party fully
endorsed the proposals.
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With the Conservative dominance of government during the
1950s, many in the opposition party looked for revision of
their traditional socialist economic approach.

The result was

the greatest period ever of social democratic strength within
the Labour Party.59 Between 1955 and 1963 Hugh Gaitskell,
with

the

support

revisionist
reformed

of

right-wing

intellectuals

party

economics.

policy

Although

to
the

such

trade
as

reflect
Clause

union
Anthony

modern
Four

leaders

and

Crosland,60

west

European

commitment

to

nationalization remained, Labour professed support for the
mixed economy.
'Britain Belongs to You,' the party's 1959 manifesto,
explained that while steel would be renationlized Labour had
"no other plans for further nationalization."61

Although

Gaitskell failed at the party conference later that year to
have the Clause Four commitment to state ownership removed
from the Constitution, the manifesto gave a clear indication
of the direction party policy had now taken.

Labour set out

a plan for the development of private industry, including a
"tax policy... directed towards helping industry to mechanize,
modernize and expand and make a maximum contribution to

59 See Ian Bradley Breaking the Mould-The Birth and
Prospects of the Social Democratic Party. Oxford: Robertson,
1981, p.45.
60 Ibid. , p.45.
61 See F.Craig British General Election Manifestos 19591987. Dartmouth: Parliamentary research Services, 1990, p.15.
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exports.1,62
Following a further election defeat in 1959, pressure
from the revisionists increased.
electorally

viable

the

Gaitskell must continue.

new

If Labour were again to be

direction

in

policy

set

by

Under Harold Wilson this proved to

be the case.
The Wilson Years 1963-1974.
The natural desire of a prime-minister and cabinet is to
govern the country.

The opportunity is open to them to

implement their own policies and beliefs, righting the nations
wrongs.

In office a leader expects the full support of his

party as he concentrates his efforts on governing.
While this may be the desire, the reality is that a
leader must be constantly aware of activist demands.

This is

especially true for Labour leaders, due to the alternative
power bases available within their party structure.

A prime-

minister may be in a position to resist demands due to his
power, but in doing so he risks the build up of internal
hostility.

A truly successful leader will strike a balance

between government and party, preventing the development of
factional division.

This is done through a willingness to

consider factional demands, accepting a party role in policy
making even when in office.

Wilson never approached the

delicate balance needed for a Labour prime-minister if party
activists

are to be kept happy.

62 Ibid., p. 16.

In Downing Street he
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increasingly ignored the demands of both the center and the
left.

As the 1964-70 government floundered, the left took the

opportunity to make advances within the party structure. While
control of the parliamentary leadership was the last area of
influence to fall to the left, it was the failures of leaders
to acknowledge diverse factions which stimulated the latter's
initial advance.
At the time of Gaitskell's death in 1963 the direction of
the party remained to the right.

Harold Wilson's traditional

affiliation had been with the moderate left of the party, but
his election as leader was a personal triumph, as opposed to
a left-wing one.

His

success

in no way

represented a

resurgence of left-wing influence over the party's direction.
As leader he confirmed this, adopting a pragmatic approach to
government, giving verbal offerings to the left but always
acting in "the Gaitskellite tradition."63
Labour's general election victory in 1964 offered new
hope, not only to the party but also to the direction of
British economics.

Their 1964 manifesto,

'Let's Go with

Labour for the New Britain,' proposed a corporatist direction
for the British economy.

A national economic plan was to be

formulated,

sides

"with

both

of

partnership with the government."64

industry

operating

The plan was to change

63 See Geoff Hodgson, Labour at the Crossroads.
Robertson, 1984, p.71.
64 Craig, p.43.

in

London:
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the structure of the British economy through a
effort1 to modernize it.

'massive

Advanced technology and science-

based industries would provide a new backbone of British
economic strength.

A Ministry of Economic Affairs would be

created to ensure a rapid increase in industrial investment.
The tax system would be used to encourage greater private
investment, while better terms of credit would also be made
available.65
The promise of a new direction for British economics,
breaking out of the stop-go cycle, created great optimism.
This was especially true within the socialist movement.

A new

level of economic growth and equality appeared to be on offer,
and was fully supported by the trade unions.
Once in office the 1964-66 government offered little real
direction.
the

Aware that a second general election was likely,

leadership

position.
pursued.

looked

only

to

consolidate

None of the promised radical

the

parties

strategies were

Although 1965 did see the establishment of the

Ministry of Economic Affairs this was, "A pale shadow of semi
corporatism national planning on the Continent; it consisted
of little more than a compendium of expected growth rates for
different industries, obtained, on the whole, by simply asking
the managers and directors within industry what their growth
targets were."66

The government even failed to operate a

65 Ibid. , p. 47.
66 Hodgson, p.77.
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macroeconomic

strategy with any real

success,

since the

refusal to devalue necessitated deflationary policies.

With

no real strategy in existence the government drifted on to the
1966 election.

Not only had an economic opportunity been

lost, but more significantly for the Labour leadership so had
been the great optimism.
reverted

to

the

By the time of the ballot Labour had

post-war

British

economic

approach

of

deflation. The run on the pound in 1966 was treated in the
same manner as by any previous Tory administration.

Spending

was cut and taxes were increased.
In the two years following Labour's reelection, economic
events dictated the direction of the government.

Currency

speculation and balance of payments deficits were met with
deflationary policies.

The Labour government appeared to

many, not only on the left of the party but also to more
moderate

trade

union

leaders,

Conservative government.
reforms promised

in 1964?

as

a

mirror

image

of

a

Where were the radical economic
Where were the benefits

for

Labour's core support group— the working class?
Confidence in the leadership was drained.

Trade union

militancy increased and the annual number of working days lost
to industrial disputes increased from an average of 2 to 3
million in the years 1964-1967, to 4.7 million in 1968, 6.8
million in 1969 and an average of 13.9 million between 1970
and 1973.67

Their growing militancy, which in 1972 resulted

67 Figures from Hodgson, p.76.
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in the most days lost to strike action since the General
Strike year of 1926, "forced the TUC [Trade Union Congress]
into a more militant posture and played their part in the
leftward movement of the Labour Party."68
With the Wilson leadership seemingly committed to a
policy of deflation, which meant increased unemployment and a
decreased standard of living, trade unionists began to shift
their support.

For many, "The abandonment of the National

Plan and the trauma of the pay freeze showed without doubt
that the government was not willing or able to deliver major
reforms in the interests of the working-class."69

By 1968

the

unions,

leadership

of

two

of

the

countries

largest

Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) and the Amalgamated
Engineering Union (AEU), had passed into the hands of the
left.

In 1969 the publication of the government White Paper,

'In Place of Strife', proposing restrictions on trade union
activities,

caused a breakdown

of relations

leadership and the bulk of the party.

between the

Both the NEC and the

trade unions openly opposed the document.

Fifty-three Labour

MPs voted against the bill on its first reading in the House
of Commons and the government was forced in to withdrawal.
Despite conceding, the damage to the leadership's position,
and its isolation from the bulk of the party, increased.
The general election of 1970 returned the Conservatives
68 Ibid. , p.83.
69 Ibid. , p.76.
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to power.

Labour's

moderate right faction had failed in

office and had led the party through external defeat.

Such

circumstances, under

the Dual Advisory Theory,

suggest an

imminent

factional control within

the

change

Subsequently

in

a new

direction for the party

relations would arrive.

party.

in external

Although the right kept control of

the parliamentary leadership through to 1980, this is what
ultimately occurred.
Through the alternative power bases within the party
structure, the left secured growing influence over policy
direction.

Wilson may have remained leader during the four

years out of office, but policy direction was increasingly out
of his hands.

This is demonstrated by consideration of the

following three areas of party division— the 1973 policy
document 'Labour's Programme for Britain,' the debate over the
EEC and the defeat of the leadership in Conference votes,
i) "Labour's Programme for Britain."

As chairman of the NEC's Home Policy Committee, Tony Benn
succeeded in including radical nationalization policies70 in
the

1973

policy

document.

Plans

were

made

nationalization of 25 major British companies.

for

the

While the

right still controlled the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP),
outside parliament, "In an environment of industrial militancy
and opposition to the Heath government, left-wing ideas were

70 See Patricia Lee Sykes Loosing from the Inside.
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988, p.30.
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gaining support."71 The 1973 document accused the leadership
of failing the party*s post-war economic pledge.

Lost was the

commitment to a true democratic socialist economic approach.
Labour had done little more than touch the edges through its
macro level Keynesian approach.

The left, and a growing

majority in the party as a whole,
wholesale economic intervention.
New

Economic

Strategy',

increasingly supported

Chapter 2 of the plan, *A

promised

to,

"bring

about

a

fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power and
wealth,

in favour of working people and their families."72

Criticism was launched at the power of a few multi-national
companies, with such a small group holding such major sway on
the British economy.

The interests of profit motivated firms

and the national interest were not seen as compatible.

To end

this dominance of the economy, direct control was planned.
This would be achieved through the creation of a new state
holding

company,

agreements.
and

workers

and

invoking

of

compulsory

planning

This process would involve, "both the government
on

the

shop

floor

in

the

development

and

restructuring of industry."73
The successful passage of this program, through both the
NEC and conference during 1973, gives a clear indication of

71 Hodgson, p.83.
72 Labour party, 'Labour's Programme for Britain.' Labour
Party: London, 1973, p.7.
73 Hodgson, p.85.
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the rising influence the left held over the policy direction
of the party.

Without the benefits

leadership could do little to resist.

of government,

the

In accepting the 1973

policy program as official party policy,

Labour made its

greatest single move to the left of the post-war period.

Many

were ready to abandon the social democratic approach, while
so-called social democrats felt increasing unease with the
direction their party was undertaking.
The deep divisions between the two wings of the party
were becoming increasingly clear.

These can be seen through

an examination of the battle for EEC membership,
ii) EEC Membership.
The issue of membership of the European Community does
not fall neatly on the left-right spectrum.

However, from the

early 1970s it was those on the right of the party who were
most vocal in support of membership.

Greatest hostility was

found on the left, from those wanting to see Britain pursue an
independent
divisive

socialist path.

that

The

issue proved to be so

speculation of a right-wing breakaway was

already in existence.

Although the suggestion was premature,

at least suggestions of a breakaway of any significance, the
divisions within the party structure were deep and hostile.
Any immediate break was prevented by the fact that moderate
control at the leadership level still remained.

Deputy-leader

Roy Jenkins may have felt alienation from his own party, but
support from fellow members for a new party was not great.
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The party still remained electorally viable, with battles
still to be fought from the inside.
As

prime

minister,

Harold

Wilson

had

applied

for

membership of the Community in 1967, and the party's 1970
manifesto had supported entry.

However, it opposed were the

terms of entry accepted by the Heath government during 1972.
The party leadership voted against the government on the
parliamentary vote for entry, but a substantial minority of
Labour MPs,

most notably deputy leader Jenkins,

completely committed to membership.

remained

In the final Commons vote

on membership, 69 Labour MPs defied a 3-line whip to ensure
the Conservative success.
Although Wilson had opposed the terms of entry accepted
by the Conservatives, he was still largely in favor of the
principle of membership.
terms

when

Labour

He promised to 'renegotiate' the

returned

referendum would be held,

to

office.

In

addition

a

a promise made to placate the

hostile left.
This was exactly what happened after the second 1974
election.

Wilson and Callaghan, the Foreign Secretary, set

out to negotiate with their new European partners to reduce
the

penal

level

of

British budgetary

contributions.

A

compromise formula was constructed, aimed at substantially
reducing the British financial input to the Community by the
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end of the decade.74 Wilson wholly endorsed membership, with
the bulk of the cabinet coming out to campaign for a 'yes'
vote in the promised referendum.
The battle between left and right in the party became
clearly pronounced during the campaign.

The pro-Marketeers

found themselves campaigning with those who had previously
been their political opponents, as Labour and Conservative
moderates found more in common with each other than with
extremes of their own parties.

the

While the right comfortably

won this battle, the leadership was further isolated from many
in its own party.

Factional divisions over policy were clear

for all to see.
iii) Conference Votes.
The growing power of the Left within the party was
demonstrated by a series of Conference resolutions opposing
the

leadership's

position.

While

conference

holds

no

constituted position to force the leadership to carry out
resolutions, the defeats suffered by the Wilson leadership
indicated a changing tide within the party structure.
internal

opposition

becomes

so

great,

the

When

leadership

ultimately must respond or be removed.
The first direct challenges to the leadership came while

74 In reality, the deal proved little better than that
negotiated by Heath due to the size of the Common Agricultural
Policy budget, which determined the level of revenues a nation
received from the Community. Britain's smaller and more
efficient agricultural sector qualified for less support than
its European counterparts.
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Wilson was still prime minister.
Conference

a

resolution

was

At the 1968 Blackpool

passed

by

4 million

votes

demanding the repeal of the governments incomes policy.75
The rebellion against a fundamental government policy was lead
by the TGWU leader, Frank Cousins.

While senior ministers

increasingly asserted "the doctrine that Labour Conference
propose but the Labour Government will dispose,"76 it became
increasingly difficult to act in this way.
paymasters

rejected

a

central

When the party's

government

policy,

the

leadership was under threat.
This pattern continued following Labour's defeat in the
1970 election.

That year's conference passed a resolution

attempting

subjugate

"to

the

party

leadership

and

the

Parliamentary Labour Party to the will of the conference."77
Wilson called for the withdrawal of the motion, but the two
biggest unions combined with the constituency parties to
ensure its success.
Conference

continued

to

leadership continued to resist.
1973

policy

conference.

document,

Wilson

pass

resolutions

and

the

Following the passage of the
did

attempt

to

placate

In his keynote speech he set out a long list of

industries that he was happy to take out of private control,
including all ports,

ship building and aircraft.

75 See The Times. October 1st., 1968, p.l.
76 Ibid.
77 See The Times. October 1st., 197 0, p.l.

Wilson

50

appeared to offer his support to the nationalization pledges
made in the policy document.

In reality he was continuing his

own policy of giving conference verbal reassurances,
acting as he saw fit.

but

A year after returning to office in

1974 the 197 3 document was forgotten.
Wilson's policy of attempting to placate conference and
the left could only work for a limited period.

Within the

party structure the balance of power had now clearly changed.
The moderate right had been forced into retreat.
surrounded
leadership.

in

its

final

bastion

of

It was now

strength— the

party

Due to the growing numbers supporting the left it

would be impossible for the moderate right to hold out for
long.
Activist Change.
Once the party was out of office it became clear that the
grass-roots had become far more radical than the leadership.
Support for left-wing proposals, most significantly the 1973
policy program, was substantial.
explained by two factors.

The cause of this support is

First,

the

failure

of

the

previous government to offer any increase in the standard of
living during its tenure obviously led to hostility.

The

administration was seen to have failed its core supporters.
A natural tendency was to look for new direction.
Second, a shift had occurred in the composition of party
membership from the early 1960s.

Middle-class intellectuals

and educated student activists became dominant, rather than
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the traditional

working-class.

Using their

oratory and

educational skills, the new activists were able to voic^ a
radical, often Marxist, brand of socialism at all levels of
the party.
At the elite level this is demonstrated by the change in
the

social origins of parliamentary members.

In 1945 39% of

new Labour MPs came from working-class backgrounds. In October
1974 the proportion was 4.6%.78

Further to this,

Dennis

Kavanagh has surveyed the change in occupational backgrounds
of Labour’s Westminster candidates.79

He classified 27% of

Labour candidates as 'talkers' in 1951. (By 'talkers' he is
referring to professions requiring oratory skills, such as
lecturers, teachers, journalists and political activists, as
opposed to traditional Labour candidates who tended to be
manual workers.)

In 1979 43% were 'talkers.'

A growth in middle-class candidates had taken place?
candidates far more likely to espouse socialist, as opposed to
social democratic, principles.
trade unions.

A similar shift was seen in

Not only was there an expansion of white collar

unions, but it was also the case that a growing number of
union office holders were university graduates, as opposed to
members who had worked their way up through the rank-and-

78 Figures from Ian Bradley Breaking the Mould.
Robertson, 1981, p.49.

Oxford:

79 See Dennis Kavanagh, "Representation in the Labour
Party," Chapter 9 of Dennis Kavanagh (ed.), The Politics of
the Labour Party. London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1982.
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file.80
The

greatest

level

constituency level.

of

change

was

found

of

educational

working-class
system,

student protest,

the

It was here that young graduates were

able to have a direct effect on the party,
control

at

they,

areas.

often taking

Radicalized

by

the

"belonged to the generation of

of demonstrations against Vietnam and in

favour of easier abortion, and of teach-ins on Marxism and
revolutionary theory."81 Their view of the Labour movement
was far removed from the traditionally moderate working-class
trade unionists, previously dominant in the party structure.
The radical socialists saw little in the 1964-70 government to
soften their views.

Wilson and the government were seen to

have abandoned socialist principles.

Through the conference

and their influence over MPs, they aimed to return them.
Destroyed was, "the fraternal, loyalist atmosphere in which
the

Labour

Party

had

normally

conducted

its

internal

affairs.1,82
The strength of the left in the alternative power bases
within the party structure meant that by 1974 a shift in
emphasis at the leadership and external level was due.

Defeat

in the general election of February that year would have
produced this. The surprise Labour victory, and confirmation
80 Bradley, p. 49.
81 Ibid. , p. 50.
82 Ibid. , p. 51.

of this in October, gave the moderate leadership a stay of
execution.

A return to the levers of power allowed it to

renew its resistance.

A successful government might have

allowed a successful fight back, but the governments failure
only served to increase hostility.

CHAPTER III
THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD
By October 1974 Labour had won four of the five previous
general elections in the UK.
country's strongest party,
division.

At

the

time

In popular terms it was the

but internally was riddled by

the

1974

electoral

success

was

celebrated, but, in the long-term, it provided for a bloodier
public battle when power was lost.
This chapter explores the 1974-79 government and sees how
the leadership was able to hold off the growing challenge of
the left.

Throughout the period left and right battled for

control, with the dispute only finally settled after the 1979
election.

It was then the party undertook a policy position

on the left-wing extreme.

The chapter concludes that the

party's move to the left can in fact only be explained by
factional divisions within the party and the Dual Advisory
Theory, not by any Downsian theory of party competition.
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the origins of
party division were to be found in differences over economic
policy.

By the 1970s the British economy was in peril.

Labour's surprise electoral success meant it was the party
which had to attempt to find a solution to the long-term
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economic decline.

The party was in no way unanimous as to the

approach to be taken.
To understand fully the crisis facing the party, it is
first necessary to explore the UK's post-war economic history
of government mismanagement.
British Economic History.
From a position of global economic dominance at the end
of the 19th century, the British economy had entered a period
of long-term decline since the early decades of the 20th
century.

During the

immediate post-war years,

over two

decades of continuous growth were enjoyed initially, but at
the expense of long-term industrial investment.

Economic

policy was dominated by an obsession with the maintenance of
a high rate of sterling.83 Whether a Labour or Conservative
government, this conviction remained.

Why?

Even in the post-war years, sterling remained a leading
international currency.
be

necessary

for

the

A high and stable level was seen to
maintenance

of

internationally and in the City of London.

confidence,

both

Many international

reserves were still held in the British currency, not only by
oil rich states but by states of the old Empire.

The British

government felt a responsibility to maintain a high exchange
rate for the sake of these investments.

The government was

aware that any sign of weakness could result in the loss of

83 Peter Jenkins, Mrs. Thatcher's Revolution. London:Pan
Books, 1987. See part 1, " The Old Order Crumbles."
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international confidence and the withdrawal of these reserves.
If a major run on the pound began, the belief was it would be
impossible to stop.

A mass exodus of deposits would occur,

creating a collapse in the currency level.

The effect of such

a collapse would go far beyond international prestige.

The

'openness* of the UK economy left it vulnerable to the import
of inflation.

A substantial fall in the value of sterling

would result in higher priced imports.

Domestic inflation

would increase and manufacturing industry, relying on imported
raw materials, would lose international competitiveness.

It

was feared that such a situation would create a spiral effect,
in which British economic failure would lead to a further fall
in the exchange rate, and a repeat of the sequence.
Emphasis on the level of sterling was clearly important,
but with the advantage

of hindsight,

it was

too great.

Sterling was kept at an artificially high rate until the
breakdown of Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s.84

The

cost of giving the currency level priority over the real
economy was two-fold— resource exhaustion and export failure,
i)

Resource

Exhaustion— Throughout

the

post-war

period

government resources were always centered on the defence of
sterling,

rather than on the problems of the structural

domestic economy.

Government policy centered on the knowledge

that a substantial or continual balance of payments deficit
84 Britain was in fact a co-founder of the Bretton Woods
system in 1944, with the United States, providing a further
reason why governments were reluctant to devalue.
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was likely to create a run on the pound.

As a result, in the

post war period the British economy was subject to a series of
deflations

and

economics.85

reflations

in

the

pattern

of

stop-go

With the operation of stop-go economics, which

proved to be a short-term economic success and a route to
political success until the late 1960s, Britain failed to
develop

an

industrial

strategy

international competitors.

comparable

to

its

major

While the UK did enjoy economic

growth, the rate did not compare to its European competitors.
Abroad,

for example in France,

industrial strategies were

employed by central governments to encourage the development
of industry.
long-term,

The French set up investment banks to provide

low rate loans to industry.

By contrast,

in

Britain, until the end of the 1960s, only a very limited
amount was spent by governments to assist and strengthen the
private sector.

Although by the 1970s the UK was spending the

same proportion of GDP on industrial grants as France and the
Federal Republic of Germany,

it was not employing their

strategy. As the Europeans concentrated on developing sectors
which would be strong international competitors, powering the
whole

of

emphasized

their

domestic

regional

aid

economies,
to

British

especially

governments

depressed

areas.

85 'Stop-Go' was the phrase coined to describe the pattern
of economics in the UK during the 1950s and 1960s. To achieve
the required balance between the balance of trade and the
exchange rate governments went through a series of deflation
and reflations. These were achieved through Keynesian demand
management techniques, but provided for only short-term
successes.
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Westminster governments found themselves in the ridiculous
situation of reflating certain areas through targeted aid,
while simultaneously deflating the national economy as a
whole.

Any aid to specific industries which UK governments

gave was to unprofitable firms,

such as Rolls Royce and

British Leyland, in bail out attempts.

These were not firms

which could fuel long-term economic growth.
Compounding the concentration on the exchange rate, the
stop-go strategy and weak industrial policy, the UK failed,
due to the independence of British industry.
parties

lacked

rationalization.

the

will

to

Both political

intervene

and

force

The Conservatives had their own political

interests tied to industry and the City, both of which opposed
large scale intervention.
nationalization,

Labourfs long standing ideology was

not the reviving of private industry.

In

addition to this, trade unions opposed wholesale intervention,
fearing a threat to their autonomy in the work place,
ii)

Export

British

Failure— The overvaluation

exports,

disadvantage.

in

price

terms,

of the pound
at

a

left

competitive

The high level of exchange meant that the

export sector of the economy was not encouraged, while imports
were relatively cheap and therefore more appealing to the
consumer.

This,

in turn,

directly

impacted on domestic

producers trying to compete for the UK market.
British

economic history

is very

much that

politics of today rather than the economy of tomorrow.

of the
During

59

the 1950s and 1960s governments were able to survive by
reflating the economy to coincide with elections, providing
short-term economic booms.

Once this threatened the exchange

rate the

introduced and the economy was

stop cycle was

deflated.

The

inflation

which

cozy trade
accompanied

off between unemployment
this

allowed

governments

achieve what, at the time, was a happy medium.

and
to

This was

destroyed in the 197 0s when inflation and unemployment hit
simultaneously and the Wilson-Callaghan government was left to
face the problems of the long-term mismanagement of the
British economy.

The international recession exposed what

clearly had been the long-term failure of UK policy.

In

coming to terms with this the Labour Party was in no way
unanimous on the direction to be taken.
The Labour Government 1974-1979.
As the second Wilson administration took office, the
left-wing dominated policy document, 'Labour's Programme for
Britain,' remained official party policy.
in

leadership

was

direction,

and by the October 1974 election it had been

largely forgotten.

a

position

to

In government the

resist

such

a

policy

Within two years it had been completely

abandoned.86 This alone would have guaranteed the leadership
further alienation from the left.

Decisions made within the

constituted party structure were being disregarded.

Worse

86 See Paul Whiteley The Labour Party in Crisis. London:
Metheun, 1983, p.129.

60

still was what the left saw as the betrayal of the party's
primary economic principle— the commitment to full employment.
The explanation for the economic direction undertaken by
the leadership was the collapse of the Keynesian strategy
universally employed by governments in the post-war period.
The

1974-79

administration

was

the

first

to

face

the

phenomenon of hyperinflation, when rising unemployment and
inflation occur simultaneously.

Inflationary pressures had

been stored up in the economy prior to Labour's accession.
During the second half of its term the Heath government of
1970-1974 implemented a 'dash for growth' strategy.

After the

government had attempted to squeeze inflation out of the
economy with cuts in spending during its first two years in
office, a complete U-turn was employed.
the

economy

at a rapid rate

Money was pumped into

in an attempt

to

increase

employment, only to store up inflation for the ensuing Wilson
administration.

Furthermore,

1973 had witnessed the over

night four-fold oil price increase.

The economic response of

most countries was to deflate their economies to control
inflation.

In Britain this did not occur.

Labour's Monetarist Conundrum.
During the 1930s the modern theory of monetarism was
established, after the Fischer equation proved a link between
the level of inflation and the level of the money supply.87
87 Irving Fisher was professor at Yale University when he
made his proposition directly tying the rate of money supply
to the rate of inflation.
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At the time governments had little regard for monetary policy,
and with the dominance of fiscal policy in the post-war era it
had commanded little attention.

The early 1950s saw Milton

Friedman and the Chicago School take up the monetarist cause,
using empirical evidence to prove the link between inflation
and the money supply.88

Examples, such as the increase in

government spending between the two world wars, were sighted.
For monetarists, inflation was the primary economic target at
all times.

Inflation is said to cause unemployment because it

leaves firms uncompetitive.
With the globally high rates of inflation in the early
1970s, monetarist solutions were increasingly sought.

During

the period of post-war prosperity the western world had never
known

simultaneously

unemployment.

high

levels

of

inflation

and

How would the new Labour government react to

this changing economic situation?89

Only a year previously

their radical economic program had promised a new socialist
assault on the British economy.
faction,

although

now

The moderate leadership

in a minority

in the

party,

did

something very different.
Had the Conservatives been successful in the February of
1974, they planned to introduce massive deflation to control

88 Milton Friedman, Studies in the Quantity Theory of
Money. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.
89 John Maclnnes, Thatcherism at Work. Philadelphia: Open
University Press, 1987. Chapter 3, "The 1970s: The system in
trouble.11
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the upwardly spiralling prices.

Labour's 1974 manifesto, 'Let

Us Work Together,' did not deviate from its traditional policy
goal of full employment.

Labour would impose no incomes

policy and would work with the unions on a basis of free
collective bargaining.

When Labour was elected many believed

it was the party best equipped to deal with inflation, due to
its trade union ties.
By February of that year, inflation already stood at 13%,
while the money supply was increasing at 25% per annum.90
Under a monetarist philosophy spending would be contracted.
None in the Labour movement contemplated such a response.

For

the first six months in office the central economic policy was
the Social Contract.

This aimed to use free collective

bargaining to reach limited wage settlements with the unions,
and so control inflation.

The idea behind the policy was that

Labour and the trade unions both realized the need for wage
restraint, and consequently agreements could be successfully
negotiated.

At this time the government did not plan to

enforce any wage increase levels.

Labour's October manifesto,

'Britain Will Win with Labour,' did set inflation reduction as
the "first and overriding priority."91

The means for doing

this remained the Social Contract, although this approach was
not to last.
90 Figures from Peter Browning The Treasury and Economic
Policv-1964-1985. New York; Longman, 1986, p.264.
91 Labour party.Britain will win with Labour. London:
Labour party, 1974, p.6.
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The rate of inflation continued to rise,

along with

public spending and the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement.
During Labour's first year in office public spending increased
from 40.4% of GDP to 45.5%, while the PSBR grew from 6.5% of
GDP to 11%.92

While monetarists called for cuts in spending

to reduce the money supply, pressure within the Labour Party
was for more spending rather than less.

The parliamentary

leadership of Wilson and Chancellor Healey held the only real
concern inside the party with the level of inflation.

Amongst

the left little regard existed for the rate of inflation—
employment was its continued objective.

By the beginning of

1975 inflation was over 20%, yet January had seen a White
Paper proposing increased spending.
It was

in the Budget of April

1975 that the first

definite shift in policy, away from the traditional socialist
approach, was seen. Public expenditure cuts off £901 million
were announced.

Tony Benn and Eric Heffer led the left's

condemnation of the new direction of policy, and were joined
by the NEC.
Healey's main

target

in the

inflation battle

still

remained wage control, but the voluntary element of the Social
Contract had clearly failed, as wage demands soared to 30, 40
and even 50%.

To control the racing inflation a compulsory

incomes policy was proposed.

A flat rate increase of six

92 Figures from Gary Peden, British Economic and Social
Policy. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1986, pp.213-222.
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pounds a week maximum was agreed.
By June 1975, when the new pay policy was introduced, the
foreign exchange markets were increasingly unstable.
failed to be convinced by the new policy,
government

lacked any real commitment

inflation.

They

believing the

in the fight with

On June 30th alone the pound

fell 5 cents.

Through the end of the year the government's sterling headache
intensified, as the level against the dollar reached a record
low, only increasing the likelihood of further inflation.
Since the Budget of 1975, when the Chancellor set the
defeat of inflation as his primary target, public spending
cuts had been on the agenda.

Healey realized the only way

inflation could be tackled in the short-term was by further
cuts.

While the incomes policy was still pursued it was

little more than a political smoke screen.93

The policy was

only a postponement of the inevitable monetarist medicine to
come.

Incomes policies had an amazingly poor record in

Britain and it was unlikely one would survive to a second or
third stage.

Politically the Chancellor's policy was designed

to keep as many groups as possible happy during 1975.
gradually

By

introducing spending cuts the Chancellor could

temporarily placate both his party and the City.
1976

The events of 1976 had a major impact on the future of

93 See Martin Holmes, The Labour Government of 1974-1979.
London: MacMillan, 1984, pp.22-40.
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the Labour Party, because it was the culmination of economic
failings in this year which resulted in the government's turn
to the IMF for assistance.

Conservative politicians have ever

since ravaged Healey and the whole Labour movement for this
decision.
the

Whenever Labour's economic competence is discussed

image of Dennis Healey and his IMF begging bowl

resurrected.

Although

the economy

did make

is

a definite

recovery by the end of 1978, the leadership of the party had
been further wounded almost beyond salvation.

The spending

cuts of 1975 were followed in February 1976 with a further
proposal from Healey to reduce public spending by one billion
pounds in 1977/78 and by a further £2.4 billion in 1978/79.94
The cuts were defeated in parliament due to rebellious leftwing

Labour

MPs.

The

cuts were

only

passed when

the

dissenters were forced into voting for the government on a
vote of confidence.
Even with the February spending cuts,
confidence in the British economy remained low.

international
Spending was

still seen as too high, especially in relation to inflation.
The markets remained nervous about investing in sterling, with
the possibility of large scale withdrawals of foreign funds
always present.
first time.

During March the pound fell below $2 for the

The response of the financial markets was panic,

as the Bank of England broke the golden rule of central banks
by selling on a falling market.
94 Ibid., pp.29-33.
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$1.70, even when substantial government funds had been used to
support it.

It was this rapid fall which triggered events

leading to the IMF call later in the year.
The Budget of 1976 only left the markets more unsettled,
as Healey disappointed them by

failing to offer further

spending cuts.

In July the Chancellor took up the option of

borrowing

billion

$5.3

support the pound.
a trap.95

governments to

The loan, set up by the US Treasury, was

In looking to avoid the IMF the government had in

fact gone a step closer.
months.

from international

This

proved

The loan had to be repaid within six
impossible

as

the

pound's

decline

continued through the fall, with $400 million of foreign
currency reserves being used to support the pound in the first
week of September alone.

The instruction was given to stop

supporting the pound, due to the fear that the whole foreign
currency loan would be used up by the time of repayment.
government had been trapped by the loan,

The

just as the US

Treasury had hoped when organizing it.
On the 10th of September the Minimum Lending Rate was
raised to 13% in an attempt to increase the demand for
sterling.

This gave the government little more than a brief

respite. The pound continued to fall, and only substantial
expenditure

cuts

would

now

satisfy

the

markets.

The

confirmation that this was indeed the path the leadership
intended to take came later that month at the annual party
95 Browning, p. 259.
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conference.

In his key note speech, Prime Minister Callaghan

explained to a hostile audience,
We used to think you could spend your way out of a
recession by cutting taxes and boosting government's
spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no
longer exists, it only worked on each occasion since the
war by injecting a large dose of inflation into the
economy followed by a high level of unemployment. Higher
inflation followed by higher unemployment.96
Those on the left saw this as an absolute betrayal of the
long established commitment to full employment.

Socialist

principles had seemingly been abandoned as monetarist theory
was employed.

While the leadership was far from embracing the

principles of monetarism, recognizing only that at that time
the

high

inflation

dictated

a

different

approach,

the

criticism from the left was savage.
The day following the Callaghan speech an application was
posted to the IMF for funds to support the pound and the
British balance of payments deficit.

With the pound below

$1.50 and the MLR up to 15% the government appeared to have
little choice but to consume the IMF medicine.

What this

entailed was a £2.5 billion cut in expenditure and the sale of
£500 million worth of British Petroleum shares to reduce the
government borrowing requirement.
1977 to 1979.
This final period of office saw the, "use of published M3
as an overriding constraint upon other aspects of policy,
96 James Callaghan, speech to Labour Party Conference
September 1976, reported in The Times. September 29th 1976,
p.l.
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which

continued

to be

conducted broadly

along Keynesian

lines.1,97
Although the economy did make a limited recovery during
1977 and 1978 the party was now deeply divided over the
direction to take.

The leadership remained highly cautious in

the remainder of their term.

Reflationary Keynesian policies

were again adopted, but only with an overriding awareness by
the government of the level of monetary expansion.
The consequence of the economic trials of the 1974-79
government was the clear definition of internal divisions.
While the 1979 election manifesto reflected the leadership
view of economic moderation, with the radicalism of 1973
having disappeared, the party was not united behind it.

A

parliamentary rump and a majority at the constituency level
openly called for a return to traditional socialist policies.
It

is

clear

from

the

examination

of

the

1974-79

government, that the failure of British economic policy in the
post war period can be seen as providing the root of the
division in the Labour Party.

Other areas of division existed

such as defence, membership of the European Community, and
internal democracy in the party, but the main split between
fight and left was over the direction of economic policy.

The

long-term failure of British economic policy meant a new
direction had to be found.

The Conservatives became high

97 J.S. Fforde, "Setting Monetary Objectives," Bank of
England Quarterly Review. June 1983 pp.200-208.
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jacked by monetarists under the Thatcher leadership.

Labour

became divided.
Due to the very fact that it was in government, Labour's
parliamentary leadership was able to dominate the construction
of the 1979 election manifesto.
short-term

victory

in

two

This proved to be only a

respects.

First,

Callaghan

antagonized party activists and union leaders due to his
failure to consult with them on the party's policy positions.
The manifesto was almost a hand-written statement from the
Prime Minister, offering little consolation to the left.

In

failing to include conference resolutions, such as the pledge
to abolish the House of Lords, he appeared only to distance
the leadership from the party as a whole.

The left saw this

as representing indifference to rank-and-file preferences and
a widening of the gap between trade unions and the leadership.
Relations between the leadership and union heads had already
been strained as the unionists felt deceived by Callaghan into
expecting

ah

Autumn

1978

election.

The

hostility

which

followed in the,"Winter of Discontent," which saw the unions
refusing to accept the government's 5% wage increase, only
heightened the breakdown in relations and further weakened the
leadership's position within the party.

Simultaneously, the

unions felt pressure from the left, assisting their move away
from their traditionally moderate position of the early 1960s.
Secondly, and more significantly, the 1979 election saw
Labour suffer its worst electoral defeat in 48 years.

The
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Conservatives offered a new hope, with the promise of attacks
on inflation, crime and the trade unions.

They were not

elected because of the new economic theory being offered
through monetarism, but because of Labour's failure.
only 37.0% of the popular vote,

Winning

almost 7% less than the

Tories, Labour suffered its worst electoral defeat of the
modern era.
While a party in government is likely to hold together
under stress, one removed from office is likely to look for
scape-goats and explanations.

Out of office the Labour Party

faced a period of self-analysis.

As the left protested the

betrayal of socialism and a failure to implement conference
decisions, their period of ascendancy had begun.

The 1979

election defeat set in motion the factional battles Which
resulted in the left securing control of the party leadership,
and a minority on the right no longer willing to continue the
fight from within the party.

The creation of the Social

Democratic Party in January 1981 represented the decision of
an internal faction to cease the battle for influence within
the party structure and establish its own,

new external

relations.
Ian Bradely sees the period from May 1979 to January 1981
representing the coming together of three different groups to
allow the split in the party.98 First came EEC Commissioner,
98 See Ian Bradley Breaking the Mould-The Birth and
Prospects of the Social Democratic Party. Oxford: Robertson,
1981, p.47.
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and former deputy leader, Roy Jenkins' return from Brussels.
In his Dimbleby lecture he gave a clear indication of his own
readiness for a break with Labour."

This was by no means

crucial to the split, as Jenkins' own hostility towards many
of his party colleagues had long since been known.

It did

however give a signal to others who were already restless.
Secondly,

future supporters of the SDP were rallying

around the country.

The Social Democratic Alliance was

formed,

becoming a federation of local social democratic

groups

in

June

1979

without

the

requirement

that

its

supporters be members of the Labour Party.
The third group, which must be seen as the key group, was
the Gang of Three.

This comprised three leading Labour

politicians, Shirley Williams, Bill Rogers, and former foreign
secretary David Owen.

It was this group which could provide

the necessary media focus and high profile for a new party, as
well as having the ability to bring with it other supporters
from Westminster.

The Gang of Three are of central concern,

because by understanding why they were provoked into leaving
the party they had served for so long it is possible to
appreciate the factional battles which changed the direction
of the party.
In the post-1979 election period Tony Benn increasingly
99 The Dimbleby lecture was a highly publicized annual
lecture given by a leading political figure. In 1979 it was
Roy Jenkins who was invited to give the lecture, which he used
as the opportunity to announce his readiness to break away
from Labour.
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identified with the left's fight for constitutional reform of
the party.

Having refused a shadow-cabinet position, Benn

argued, along with militant activists, that MP's alone should
not have the power to elect the party leader.

The ideological

gap between party leadership and party activists clearly
became greater as activists called for more accountability and
internal party democracy— obviously to their advantage.
The ascendancy of the left is demonstrated by the series
of conference resolutions passed between 1979 and 1981.
October

1979

Conference

voted

for

the

The

introduction

of

mandatory reselection for MPs.

For many who later joined the

SDP this proved to be decisive.

Sitting MPs would now have to

submit

themselves

parliament.
would

simply

for

renomination

at

least

once

every

The right-wing of the party argued that this
make

MPs

delegates

of

the

local

General

Management Committees, which were increasingly dominated by
the

left.

This

was

treated

as

an

principles of representative democracy.

abandonment

of

the

MPs would ho longer

be representing the interests of their constituents but would
be dominated by the concerns and demands of local party
activists.
This decision was followed by the first special Wembley
Conference in May 1980, which saw the endorsement of the
document 'Peace, Jobs and Freedom', constructed by the left.
This was strongly pro-unilateralist and anti-EEC document,
envisioning an economic policy dependent on import controls
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and a rejection of incomes policy.100
The election of Michael Foot, a traditional ally of the
left,

as party leader in the Autumn of 1980 was further

evidence to the social democrats of an ideological shift and
defeat.

Had Dennis Healey been successful in his bid for the

leadership, readiness to support him in a continued battle for
control of the party may well have been greater.
with

the party

now

supporting withdrawal

However,

from the

EEC,

unilateral disarmament and further nationalization, the social
democrats

found

themselves

diametrically

opposed

to

the

policies of their own party.
The

second

Wembley

Conference

in

institutionalized the power of the left.

January

1981

Endorsed were the

new electoral college for the selection of leader, providing
for an extension of the union block vote.
proposal

The alternative

of the right for one man one vote was soundly

defeated.

This proved the final catalyst for breakaway.

The

Limehouse

Declaration101 followed

and

almost

immediately,

only a week later the launch of the SDP.
The split in the party was by no means a short-term
100 It is interesting to note that at this conference
David Owen was booed and hissed as he attempted to defend the
principle of multilateralism.
This is said to have a
substantial effect on his own determination to fight for
social democratic principles from within the party, and
enhanced his willingness to look increasingly for an external
solution.
101 The Limehouse Declaration came from Jenkins, Williams,
Owen and Rogers confirmed their inability to support the
Labour Party in future.
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phenomenon.

By the time of the 1974 election factionalized

pressure was already substantial, and had Labour not been
elected deeper divisions would have emerged far sooner.

As it

was, the 1974-79 period was key to the seeming failure of the
moderates

in government and,

to the establishment of an

alternative power base for the left through the constituency,
and

ultimately the

conference.

When

this

strength was

combined with union support, the moderates found themselves
powerless.

The constitution of the party allowed for the

development of more than one power center, which the left
successfully exploited.
The 1979-81 period confirmed the new dominance of the
left.

Without the responsibilities of office, it was able to

take control of the party and change the policy direction.
The loss of the factional control to the left meant that a
breakaway was the only option for some on the right, but by no
means all. Most members of the center and right remained loyal
to the party.

The left was in clear ascendancy at the time of

the 1983 election campaign, but enough moderates remained to
fight another day.
For the bulk of its term, the first Thatcher government
struggled badly in opinion polls.
formed

Alliance102 held

Both Labour and the newly

comfortable

leads

in

popularity

102 An electoral alliance was formed between the new SDP
and the Liberal party, located between Labour and the
Conservatives on the political spectrum. While the parties
remained separate they did not compete against each other in
any electoral constituency.
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terms. By 1981 Britain faced its worst post-war recession as
unemployment

rocketed

approached four.
prime-minister

first

to

three

million,

then

Mrs.Thatcher became the most unpopular
since

polling

records

began

Conservatives seemed certain to face defeat.
by two factors.

and

and

the

They were saved

The Falklands War arrived during 1982 to

transform Mrs.Thatcher1s image in to a strong and unshakable
leader.

More significantly the Conservatives were saved by

the ineptness of Labour.
Labour under the Left.
Once the left had taken control of nearly all areas
within the party, including the leadership, it confirmed the
change

in external policy direction.

The 1983

election

manifesto envisaged Britain taking a true socialist path.
Nationalization would be greatly expanded, while membership of
the EEC would be halted. When pressed on where Britain's
trading future would lie, Michael Foot responded that links
with the Eastern European states would now be explored.
Unilateralism was to be the party's defence policy, with
Britain abandoning its nuclear deterrent at the height of the
new cold war.

Labour was offering the country its most left-

wing government ever, four years after the selection of the
most

right-wing.

The

party

plunged

in

opinion

polls,

ultimately fighting with the Alliance for the mantle of main
opposition.
Although the Conservatives were successful in reducing
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inflation, their professed economic priority, they were still
reelected in 1983 in the middle of an economic recession.

Not

only were they reelected they were returned with an increased
House of Commons majority, from 44 to 144.
popular vote, the Tories led Labour by 14.8%.

In terms of the
The Labour vote

collapsed to only 27.6%, only two percentage points more than
the Alliance.

It appeared that Labour might be about to be

passed as the official opposition party in Britain.
Labour had failed to make electoral gains out of the
issue of unemployment, and on other economic issues they were
not trusted.

The new policies constructed since the 1979

election were thoroughly rejected by the electorate.

The

party's humiliation meant that it was once again thrown into
an immediate electoral post-mortem.

Media opinion held that

the leftward direction the party had undertaken ensured their
defeat.

The immediate reaction of many within the party was

that the leftward march must stop.

With the left's control of

the bulk of the party's institutions this could only be a long
and slow process.
The 1983 defeat gave a new factional impetus to the
moderates.

The left had failed in a spectacular manner,

allowing, under the Dual Advisory Theory, a fresh change in
factional control.

However, as was the case with the rise of

the left, the process would be a long one.

The stranglehold

the hard left had secured meant that no quick shift back
towards a the right could occur.

Factional supporters from
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the center and right of the party were joined by moderates on
the

left

in a long-term attempt to salvage the party's

electoral future.
to occur,

The whole process of factional change had

once again,

internally,

before major

external

changes in policy could be achieved.
What the 1983 general election did for many in the Labour
movement was convince them that the party's survival could
only be guaranteed by a shift away from the left.

Under the

then current electoral conditions in Britain, only a Labour
party heading towards the center could be successful.

While

such a motion certainly carried a Downsian appearance, of
greater significance were the internal battles again to be
fought and the party's response to the successful Thatcherite
agenda.

CHAPTER IV
LABOUR'S ELECTORAL VIABILITY
From the moment of his election to the position of party
leader in 1984, Neil Kinnock embarked upon a long-term process
of modernization.

At the outset he himself had no knowledge

of the extent of the reforms he would drive through the party.
As he took over the party's most senior office he remained a
traditional associate of the left and of socialism.

In 1986

he published 'Making Our Own Way' in which he stressed the
need

for

government

economic

planning,

while

making

a

commitment to social ownership and the government taking
shares in private enterprises.103

By 1992 he was leading a

party committed to the development of small business, as well
as one which had long since forgotten its hostility towards
the European Community.
As the two chapters following this will demonstrate, the
Kinnock modernization process was a long and gradual one.

For

a party to take such a continuous journey across the political
spectrum was previously unknown in British politics.

The new

leader did not begin with the goal of producing the most
right-wing Labour Party ever, but with the goal of defeating
the

extreme

left-wing

of

the

electorally competitive again.

103Ibid., p. 186.
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party

and

making

Labour

With regard to this goal, the
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question which was asked several times during the 1980*s was
whether it was ever attainable.

Regardless of any changes the

party might undertake, had the sociological make-up of British
society

changed,

and been

changed by the

succession

of

Thatcher governments, as to leave Labour unelectable?
Prior to the examination of the Kinnock modernization
process, this chapter seeks to answer this question.

With

their fourth consecutive election defeat in 1992,

is the

Labour party now unelectable in any metamorphosis?

Record

defeats for the party in 1979 and 1983 were followed by
improved results for the changing party in 1987 and 1992.
However,

even

in the midst

of

the

1992

recession,

the

Conservatives secured a solid victory over the 'new* Labour
Party.

The 1992 contest will be examined in detail in the

final section of this study, while this chapter concentrates
on the elections to 1987.
Winning 37% of the vote in the 1979 general election was
seen as such as disaster by many in the Labour Party that its
whole policy direction was changed in the following years.
With the left dominating the 1983 election manifesto, the
Party plunged to only 27.6% of the popular vote.

In terms of

average votes per constituency contested, Labour had made its
worst electoral performance ever.
system saved Labour from,

Only the British electoral

at best,

sharing the title of
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Official Opposition with the Alliance.104

With the disaster

of 1983 it was clear to the vast majority both inside and
outside the party that major policy and personnel reforms must
follow if Labour was to have any hope of survival.
Neil Kinnock began to implement such reforms.

From 1984

By May 1986

Labour had an 8% lead in opinion polls over the government.
Was the party again viable?
The June 1987 election result proved a disappointment to
many in the party.

After having led the Conservatives for

much of the second Thatcher government the hope was that a
respectable performance would be made, even though Britain was
enjoying a short-term economic boom.

As it was,

Labour

collected only 30.8% of the national vote, with a Conservative
popular vote victory of 12.5%.

The Tories maintained a

majority in the House of Commons of more than 100 seats over
all other parties.

Labour had improved its showing in 1987,

but had still suffered its second worst electoral defeat ever.
The very fact that Kinnock had been successful in modernizing
the

party

to

a degree

by

this

time,

with

commentators

stressing the highly professional campaign mounted by Labour,
only increased questions about Labour ever again being viable.

104Had a proportional representation system been in
operation it is almost certain that Labour would have been
relegated to third place in British politics, and quite
possibly to future electoral oblivion. Although the popular
vote did see the party collect two percentage points more than
the Alliance, the plurality system encouraged a substantial
number of voters not to vote for the Alliance even though it
was their first choice.
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It was argued that if a reformed Labour Party could still not
reach a position to challenge the Conservatives, then its
electoral problems must be far more than political.
sociological

changes

occurred

to

such

an

extent

Had
that,

regardless of what was performed at the national level, Labour
could not win an election?

To answer this it is necessary to

examine

changes which have

the

sociological

occurred

in

Britain over the past two decades.
Sociological Factors.
Between 1945 and 1970, Labour*s popular support at the
national ballot box never fell below 40%.
exceeded

40%

only

once,

and

then

only

Since 1970 it has
by

0.2%.

Many

explanations of this continual decline have been offered in
terms of social changes: Labour's core support group, the
working

class,

is

said

to

have

been

shrinking;

the

Conservative stronghold group of the middle class has been
expanding?

class as a whole is said to have become less

significant? a growth has occurred in home ownership and a
parallel decline in council house tenancy? the electorate has
become more rational with regard to voting? union membership
has declined,

and the Thatcher government carried out a

wholesale expansion of popular capitalism.
such

arguments

Traditionally,

two

major

areas

must

In deciphering
be

considered.

Labour was seen as the party representing

working-class interests, the Conservatives the middle-class.
It was suggested that the proportionate size of the working-

class had shrunk to such an extent by the 1980s, that a Labour
victory built upon this core support group became impossible.
Alternatively the proposition was posed that Conservative
policy, most notably the sale of council houses, had won the
government the support of traditional Labour supporters, thus
cutting away Labour support amongst traditional groups.
Looking first at the question of a declining workingclass, Heath et al establish 5 different class groups by the
use of employment patterns.105
(The five are managerial,

routine non-manual,

petty

bourgeoisie, blue collar elite, and working class). Discussed
are the proportions of the electorate which construct these
groups and how they have changed between 1964 and 1983.

What

Heath et al discover is that the proportions in the first two
groups,

groups

expected to

favor the

political support, increase substantially.
each to 27% and 24% respectively.106

Conservatives with
They grew from 18%

By contrast, the final

two groups, presumed Labour identifiers, fell from 10% and 47%
to 7% and 34% respectively.107 Classes associated with Labour
support clearly declined.

A second survey108 confirms this

trend. It compares economic activity in 1951 with that in
105 See Anthony Heath, et al. p. 29.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 See Heath,A and S.MacDonald, "Social Change and the
future of the Left."
Political Quarterly. Vol.58, 1987,
pp.364-377.
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1981. The percentage employed in white collar work during this
time doubled, while the proportion of manual workers in the
workforce fell from 62% to 45%.

The electoral consequences of

such changes would not benefit Labour.
These figures do demonstrate that the class structure in
Britain has changed.

Heath et al go on to make calculations

as to the total impact of this change on voting.

While it is

true that the electorate is now more middle class and more
educated, social changes have not been so great as to create
a 13% drop in Labour's share of popular support between 1964
and 1987.

While conceding that social changes may account for

some of the long-run changes in voting, Heath et al estimate
only

an

overall

shift

equating

to

a

2.7%

growth

in

Conservative support, a 4% loss for Labour and a 1.8% increase
for the Alliance or center party.

This data does not offer an

adequate explanation for the last four election results.
An alternative
electorate became

sociological

explanation

'Thatcherite.1109

is that the

The argument forwarded

was that due to the policies of the Thatcher governments,
traditional class voting loyalties were broken down. Voter
socialization

was

said

to

no

longer

demonstrates that this was not the case.

apply.

Evidence

Heath et al do

identify a slow decline in the percentage holding a specific
party identification.

When the figures for those with a "very

109 See Ivor Crewe,
"Has the Electorate become
Thatcherite," in Robert Skidelsky, Thatcherism. London: Chatto
and Windus, 1988.
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strong" and "strong identification" are combined the fall for
the Conservatives is from 89% in 1964 to 77% in 1987, and for
Labour

89% to 73%.

In addition to this, they find a 25% drop

among those with a very strong party identification during
this same period.110

While party identification is still

significant, its decline is unquestioned.

From this it can be

concluded that voters are less tied to traditional party
allegiances, leaving them free to vote on issues other than
automatic party identification.
Heath et al argue however, that issues have always been
significant over the past 25 years.

In the early 1960s, they

suggest, voters were influenced, rather than constrained by,
childhood socialization, but while party identification did
exist, the party line was followed no closer than today.
Electoral stability was maintained not by party loyalty alone
but also by stable attitudes in the electorate.

When parties

do not change, stable attitudes result.

Overall volatility

was far higher between 1979 and 1983,

when parties were

perceived to have changed substantially, than between 1983 and
1987.

Heath et al demonstrate that overall volatility of

voters between elections has not increased by any great
extent, being only 6% greater between 1983/87 than 1966/70.
They suggest that the availability of a third party in the
1980s may well have been enough to explain the volatility— as
opposed to any growth in vote switching.
110 Heath et a l . p. 53.
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From this it can be suggested that voters today are today
no more nor less likely to break from party allegiance than
they were 25 years ago.

What this means for the current

Labour Party is that if voters voted, at least in part, on
issues in the 1960s when Labour was able to enjoy electoral
success, no reason exists why this should not be repeated in
the

1990s— providing the party can make

a popular

issue

appeal.
A similar pattern is found when specific Thatcherite
policies are examined.

It has been argued that the sale of

council houses was a policy designed by the Conservative
government for its believed electoral benefits. Home owners
were thought to be far more likely to vote Tory than council
tenants.

However, while it is true that housing does have a

significant relationship to vote, Labour lost votes among
working class owner-occupiers and local authority tenants
alike.

Factors which caused Labour to lose votes amongst the

working class affected both these groups alike.
Public attitudes towards central Thatcherite principles
also fail to support the proposition that there was a shift in
ideological

support.

In 1979

13% believed that welfare

benefit was too low, but by 1987 this had risen to 54%. In
1980

50% believed inflation should be the main economic

objective, but by 1986 75% believed unemployment should be,
even if it meant an increased rate of inflation.

In 1979

equal numbers wanted increases in public expenditure and tax
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cuts,

but

in

increases.111

1987

six

times

more

wanted

expenditure

From these statistics Ivor Crewe reaches a

conclusion that the electorate was not transformed to believe
in Thatcherite principles.112

Instead Tory electoral success

was based upon the promise of strong government, and political
circumstance.
From these arguments it can be concluded that while
limited changes have occurred in relative class size, little
change has occurred in the electorates sociological character.
Class changes are not an adequate explanation of Labour*s
electoral failures.

The fact that in both 1983 and 1987

Labour lost votes to the Alliance in all classes means that
relative class voting has remained largely unchanged.

Labour

remained through the 198 0s proportionately stronger amongst
working class voters, but saw a loss of support across the
social spectrum, not just in the working class.
This evidence demonstrates that sociological explanations
of Labour's failure are far from conclusive.

Changes in the
;

size of social classes did have an adverse effect upon Labour,
but not to such an extent as to consign it to electoral doom.
At the same time social attitudes were not captured by the
Thatcherite right, leaving elections to be fought on political
grounds.

What Labour needed to do after the 1987 election was

111 Ibid.
112 Ivor Crewe, Political Communications: The General
Election Campaign of 1983.
New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1986.
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to

increase

its

political

popularity

across

the

social

spectrum.
Political Factors.
In explaining the Conservative hat-trick of victories
between 1979 and 1987 political, as opposed to sociological,
explanations are key.

Considering first the 1979 ballot it is

beyond dispute that the 1974-79 government had faced major
obstacles

during

its

term

of

office.

The

inflationary

struggles of the mid-1970s had a definite effect on the
party's electoral prospects.

Although by late 1978 the

situation had vastly improved, the "Winter of Discontent"
removed hopes of further electoral success. The 1979 election
represented the simple rejection by the electorate of a
government adjudged to have failed.

A Conservative Party

promising to take office and assault both inflation and the
trade unions appeared a very pleasant alternative.

Labour was

rejected in 1979, and the Tories were embraced as the only
possible alternative.
was in full swing.

By 1983 the self-destruction of Labour
While other factors certainly played a

role in the election result, Labour's weakness had a direct
effect in a three fold manner.
1:

The

Conservatives

opposition.

were

left

without

any

viable

With Labour members busy fighting each other, and

the Alliance hampered by the plurality system, Mrs.Thatcher1s
government really did appear the only choice for Britain.
Since the 1982 budget economic expectations had substantially
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increased, rallying support for the Conservatives.113
2:

For the 1983 election Labour was offering the electorate

its most left-wing platform ever.

With policies such as

withdrawal from the EEC, unilateral nuclear disarmament and
pledges from the party leader to open up trade links with
Eastern Europe, defeat was predictable.
3:

The division of the party and the creation of the

Alliance left the opposition vote severely divided.

Labour

was seen to lack real credibility and suffered from a poor
leader and campaign that were both treated with disdain.
By 1987 Britain was enjoying one of its greatest periods
of post-war prosperity.

While it lasted only a short time,

and has been paid for almost ever since, it did leave the
government in a very strong position.

While the Conservatives

113 The Falklands War of 1982 did help the Conservative
Party in terms of electoral appeal, but it was not key in
their electoral success. David Sanders, Hugh Wood and David
Marsh, "Government Popularity and the Falklands War: A
Reassessment," British Journal of Political Science. Vol.17,
part III, 1987, pp.281-313, concludes that the war gave the
government a 3% boost in support for three months during 1982.
By June 1983 its effects were not significant, with support
for the Conservatives already rallying in the wake of the 1982
budget.
Increased personal economic expectations, were
combining with
theweakness of the oppositionto drive the
growing support ofthe government.
Sanders et al conclude
that the
war
was"inconsequential" in the Conservative
victory.
Harold Clarke, William Mishler and Paul Whiteley,
"Recapturing the Falklands: Models in Conservative Popularity,
1979-83," British Journal of Political Science. 1990, part II,
pp.63-81, re-examines this matter. While concluding that the
war had benificial effects on Mrs. Thatcher*s image and the
electorates judgement of her as prime minister, it conceedes
that by
the1983
vote "the war's direct impact had
dissipated."
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may

not

have

performed

as

well

as

Labour

in the

days

immediately prior to voting, by this time the election was
already secure.

The work of Miller et al114 supports this

with their demonstration of the importance of both the long
and short-term political campaigns.

If social changes had

occurred to such an extent as to make the Labour Party no
longer electorally viable, the campaign process, lasting over
18 months, would have seen little change in the support of the
parties.

What Miller et al demonstrate is the important role

political factors played during this period in the adjustment
of electoral support.

They demonstrate that during the 'long-

campaign* the government was able to solidify its position.
The long-campaign is seen as beginning in early 1986, at
a time which

found the

Conservatives

in deep political

trouble, most notably with the Westland affair.
with this problem,

However, even

the government was only 6% behind in

opinion polls, by no means a disastrous mid-term position. In
terms of the British Social Attitudes survey they trailed
Labour

by

prospects.115
still

only

1%,

While

clearly
the

suggesting

government

suffered a credibility gap

good

long-term

had problems,

Labour

in terms of governing.

Although Neil Kinnock had shown increasing competency in
reforming the party, the electorate still needed convincing of
114 See William Miller, et al. How Voters Change. The 1987
British Election Campaign in Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1990.
115 Ibid. , p.55.
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the party's governing ability.

In organizing a widely praised

campaign effort, the party was not only serving the purpose of
electioneering, but equally importantly it was demonstrating
an ability to act as a coherent body. Having a reputation for
disorganization

meant

the

party

had

to

campaign

in

an

exceptional manner, even before it could be considered by the
electorate as a real alternative.
The government knew that their support was greatest
amongst the expanding sectors of the population, such as the
self-employed salariat, home-owners and non-trade unionists,
and consequently directed policy towards them.

Through the

very fact that it is in government, the governing party tends
to have an advantage in a pre-election period.

Manipulation

of political events and the economy are open to it for
electoral gain.
While Labour was indeed successful in organizing to a
superior

level

during

the

long-campaign,

it

was

the

Conservatives who made the greater gains due to their position
in government.

The key to this success was the economic

manipulation they carried out with cuts in income tax in both
1986 and 1987 (by 2 percent in the later year) , along with
public expenditure increases.

This combined with an inflation

rate which appeared to be well under control and unemployment
which was consistently falling.
only

just

dipped

below

Although unemployment had

3 million

by

election

day,

the

Conservatives had successfully lowered the expectations of the
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electorate in this area in terms of employment norms.
to

this,

they

had

continually

altered

the

Further

method

of

calculation, or "fixed the figures," to exaggerate a downward
trend,

which they regularly stressed.

While balance of

payments deficits increased, the electorate had little concern
with a phenomenon they could not see as they enj oyed the
Lawson boom.
It was during the winter of 1986/7 that Miller et al see
the

Conservatives making

their greatest

gains.

Between

November 1986 and the following March they were able to
manufacture approval of their economic performance, purely for
short-term electoral advantage. The shift in economic optimism
was greatest amongst those who were already inclined to vote
Conservative,
others.

but this optimism was then communicated to

This optimism peaked for the June ballot, and was

gone soon after.

Had Mrs.Thatcher chosen to wait until the

Autumn of 1987 for the ballot, coinciding with the stock
market crash, the level of optimism would have been very
different.

The economic prosperity proved to be of political,

not economic, advantage.

The Lawson boom was achieved in

classic Keynesian style with tax cuts to increase spending,
coupled

with

low

interest

shadowing of the D-Mark.

rates

to

allow Mr.

Lawson's

Stored up was massive inflation,

further exacerbated by a substantial government injection of
spending

into

the

economy

after

the

crash.

While

the

Conservatives totally misjudged the economy, fuelling it up
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for the election and then continuing to do so after the vote,
the

episode

demonstrates

the

advantageous

position

a

government can find itself in the run up to a ballot.
With regard to the short final campaign the emphasis is on
maintaining a position and not losing ground.

Miller et al

demonstrate that during this final period voter considerations
did change, although the polls appeared largely stable.

The

fact is that movements largely cancelled each other out,
although issues and leaders were clearly significant.
What we can perceive is that while the period may have
appeared stable, the potential for significant changes in
fortune was present.

Alignment between voters and parties was

sufficiently weak as to cause fluctuations of considerable
impact.

1987 was not an exception to this, but the movements

simply cancelled each other out.
This

chapter

demonstrates

that

political

factors

conspired to ensure three successive electoral defeats for
Labour.

By 1992 these factors had again shifted to leave the

two main parties running neck-and-neck and an election too
close to call throughout the campaign.

Labour was successful

in adjusting to the political climate in the UK, with Kinnock
modernizing the party and moving to the center ground to
achieve electoral viability.
a

25%116 lead

in

opinion

The fact that Labour could hold
polls

in

Spring

1990

clearly

116 See Gallup poll for The Daily Telegraph. April 6th,
1990, p.l.
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demonstrates that political fluctuations can easily overturn
any cumulatively minor social changes and determine electoral
success.

CHAPTER V
INTERNAL REFORM, 1983-1987.
The challenge which Labour faced on the morning of June
10th 1983 was of reestablishing itself as the main opposition
to the Conservatives, and as a realistic alternative in
government.

The task was not an impossible one.

Although the

1983 election left the party in the weakest position since its
foundation,

Labour

failures

were

largely

political.

A

reformed and modernized party would have the opportunity to
reverse the decline.
This chapter explores the initial stages of the party
reform which centered on a fresh shift in factional control,
with the decline of the left, and the construction of a new
image of managerial competence.

The Kinnock modernization

strategy came to be centered on three areas.
new

level

of

leadership

control

was

Internally, a

established

national level, through a soft left/right alliance.

at the
Secondly

the party's image was reformed, with the aim of presenting the
image of a team and leader ready for government and for the
trust of the nation.

The final stage of the Kinnock-led

reforms came in the shape of major policy changes following
the

1987

election,

which

are

examined

in

the

following

chapter.
Although Neil Kinnock's election to the position of
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party leader in 1983, as part of the 'dream ticket'117 with
Roy Hattersley, signified the start of major reforms, changes
in internal factional strengths had already begun to occur.
The weakening of the left's grip on the party dates back to
Michael Foot's selection as leader in 1981.
1981-1983.
1981 proved to be the pinnacle of achievement for the
left of the party.

Having built up support, first, at the

constituency level, and then from the unions, the left now
secured control of the party's premier office.

What it now

needed was a period of internal calm to allow concentration on
external battles.118

The changes in policy which the left

brought had to be communicated to the electorate.

In reality,

the party in-fighting continued, first with the break by the
SDP

and

then

with

divisions

amongst

the

left.

Seyd

writes,"Intra-Party politics were at their most intense and
the electorate were treated as mere passive bystanders."119

117 Kinnock and Hattersley were the two leading contenders
for the leadership position following the resignation of
Michael Foot. Once Kinnock was successful, the combination of
the two in the leader and deputy role seemed to have the ideal
electoral and party balance.
Kinnock from the left could
carry the bulk of the party with him, while Hattersley from
the right demonstrated the new direction the party had now
undertaken. Consequently many party insiders saw the two
combining as the dream ticket.
Left.

118 See Patrick Seyd, The Rise and Fall of the Labour
Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1987, p.134.
119 Ibid., p.159.
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Only months after the left's success divisions in the
party were once again gashed open with Tony Benn challenging
Dennis Healey for the post of deputy leader.

Benn, the long

time darling of the radical left, believed his strong support
at the constituency level could ensure the defeat of the
right-wing's Healey.

At a time when the party needed a united

front for external battles, the "election campaign developed
into a bitter five-month clash between Left and Right which
undermined the Party's electoral base."120

As a consequence

party support fell by 7% between July and December 1981.
As Benn launched his challenge he entered into a series
of public disputes with Michael Foot. Benn opposed Foot's
efforts to persuade MPs defecting to the SDP to remain loyal,
because he wanted the party to move in a true socialist
direction.

Such possible defectors would not be welcome.

In

making the attempts Foot realized the need for unity if the
party were to have a long-term future.

Simultaneously he

sought unity by publicly appealing to Benn not to stand in a
deputy contest.

His calls fell on deaf ears and the left

divided.
When Callaghan was leader, and seen as a representative
of the right, the left tended to unite in opposition.

Now,

with left wing control of the party, many on the soft left
were unable to associate themselves with the radical militancy
associated with Benn and the Bennites.
120 Ibid. , p. 160.

Men such as Neil
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Kinnock found themselves identifying more with the center than
the radical left.
The first indication of a new shift in the balance of
power in the party, away from the hard left to the center and
right, came with elections to the party's National Executive
later in 1981.

A trade union-led offensive allowed

six new

members to be elected with right-wing party credentials.
The

second

strike

against

the

left

came

with

the

retirement of Reg Underhill as the Party's National Agent.
For a number of years Underhill had charged that Trotskyite
infiltrators

were

operating

inside

the

party.

This

contravened the party's constitution which forbids groups
within the party having their own agendas and programs outside
the official party program.121

The NEC had consistently

rejected

such

his

published

a

charges,
29

page

so

on

document

retirement

entitled,

'The

Underhill
Entryist

Activities of the Militant Tendency.'
The result of this was a soft left/right coalition on the
NEC securing an inquiry in to the charges.

The Hayward-Hughes

report proposed that all non-affiliated groups made up of
party members must apply for registration, giving details of
their aims and organization.

The NEC accepted the proposals,

which were seen as an attack on the hard left.

It was

concluded that Militant Group members were ineligible for
party membership, but problems of secrecy and definition left
121 See Labour Party Constitution Clause II Section (3).
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this impossible to enforce.

The only expulsions were of the

five-person editorial board of the Militant newspaper, but,
"the issue had now caused considerable disunity within the
Labour Left."122
The expulsions were followed by a direct attack by Foot
on

Peter Tatchell,

the party

candidate

selected

by

the

Bermondsey CLP for the constituency's upcoming byelection.
Tatchell was unquestionably a supporter of the hard left, but
was not, in all likelihood, the Trotskyite Foot accused him of
being.

The NEC refused to confirm his selection, although

Tatchell remained the choice due to constituency backing.
Tatchell was defeated in the by-election vote by SDP candidate
Simon Hughes, but the whole incident further demonstrated the
divisions in the left which were already in existence.
While many in the party supported the expulsions and Foot's
actions, the hard left feared a revival of centrist domination
of the party,
aspirations.

for so-long the obstacle to their policy

What the divisions produced was a generation of

media attention for the Militant group, which their relatively
small size in no way warranted.

Their lack of numbers did not

stop the Tory press seizing upon the opportunity to create the
party's 'Loony Left' image, leaving the new leadership facing
a substantial problem.

The whole of the party faced being

tarred with the same brush as a militant few.
One advantage produced by these events
122 Seyd, p. 164.

for the new

99

Kinnock leadership was the opportunity to take on a divided
opposition.

A second advantage for the new leader, and more

importantly, was the party's massacre at the polls in 1983.
This was as clear an indication as possible that the left's
policies,

such

as

high

taxation,

unilateral

nuclear

disarmament, and withdrawal from the EEC, had alienated even
traditional Labour supporters.

Although Patrick Seyd123 does

suggest that had the left concentrated more on wining the
support of the electorate and less on party activists they may
have had more electoral success, the perceived picture in June
1983 was the left-wing policies had almost destroyed the
party.

What was needed now was unity behind fresh leadership.

1983-1987.
Following the party's, and his own personal, humiliation
in the 1983 ballot Michael Foot resigned as party leader
almost immediately.

The race to succeed him was run between

Kinnock and Hattersley.

From the beginning it was clear that

the Welshman would easily triumph.

This was confirmed when he

collected over 70% of all votes cast in the October ballot.
Kinnock was a candidate from the center-left.

His long

term allegiances had been with the left of his party but never
with Militant.

The very reason he proved so successful in the

contest, and ultimately in guiding the party through internal
reforms, was because his home was on the left.

As the party

platform shifted from left to right in subsequent years,
123 Seyd, p. 159.

Kinnock personally went through the changes in policy and
principle that his party platform did.
upon this very fact.

His success was built

The left accepted the harsh realities of

reform only because they were taught them by one of their own.
Had a representative of the right been selected in 1983 and
then attempted to preach reforms to the left, rebellion would
have ensued.
The size of the electoral college vote which Kinnock
secured allowed him to claim a far greater party mandate than
any of his predecessors.

He was now head of a party far more

receptive to strong leadership due to the obvious need to
reform and unite.

With the soft left being aware of the

threat Militant would pose to any future election prospects,
they were far more willing to see a reassertion of central
control and a move to the right.
primary aim.

For Kinnock, "Unity was a

But modernization and change were the overriding

imperatives from the outset."124
If electoral fortunes were to revive, Kinnock knew that
the

Militant

removed.

stranglehold

around

Labour's

neck must

be

To do this he needed his own support base, which he

consciously set about constructing.

His priority was an

alliance on the NEC between the soft left and the right to
back him in a challenge to Militant.125
124 Colin Hughes and Patrick Wintour, Labour Rebuilt. The
New Model Party. London: Fourth Estate, 1990, p.7.
125 Ibid.
Around".

See chapter 1,

"1983-1987 The First Time
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A

supporting

alliance

with

the

NEC

reduced

the

possibility of challenges to the leadership growing out of
alternative power bases.

This may appear an obvious tactic to

employ, but previous leaders such as Wilson and Callaghan had
neglected such action.

The consequence for them had been the

left securing a grip on many of the party's policy making
institutions.

As Kinnock built the soft left/right alliance

on the NEC and established a partnership between the NEC and
the Shadow Cabinet as the core policy body, the hard left
became isolated within the party.
Challenging Militant.
Neil Kinnock was always opposed to the Militant Tendency
within his party.

Despite this distaste, during the first two

years of his leadership he resisted a direct attack upon them.
He knew that any future assault would only be possible if he
could first work to secure his own position and win the
confidence of the soft left.

With this done, he was well

aware that a challenge to Militant had to come.

The media

portrayal of the hard left of the Labour party was such that
a large number in the electorate were genuinely fearful of
what a Labour electoral victory would mean.

Once in office

would the extremists assert control of the government?

The

bulk of the tabloid press, and some not so tabloid, would have
the electorate believe that the answer was yes.

Even if

nationally it did not constitute a highly significant number,
Militant was hurting the long-term electoral prospects of
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Labour.

For the modernization strategy to be successful it

had to be purged.
Kinnock used his party conference speech in the fall of
1985 to launch a direct assault on the Militant stronghold of
Liverpool City Council on Merseyside.

Kinnock began his

savage attack by claiming, "Impossible policies start with far
fetched resolutions.

They are then pickled into rigid dogma

and go through the years outdated, misplaced and irrelevant to
the real needs of our people."126
Liverpool

council

and the

He spoke directly of the

"grotesque scene"

of a Labour

Council "hiring taxis to scuttle round a city handing out
redundancy notices to its own workers."127
Liverpool had placed itself on a collision course with
the government, over spending and rates, for a battle it was
bound to lose.

Kinnock knew this.

fearing job losses,
vulnerable.

With council employees

Kinnock saw the local

leadership as

In accusing the Militant leadership of not caring

about the party's success but only about their own extreme
ideology, he demonstrated strong leadership and led the party

126 Neil Kinnock to Labour Party Conference October 1st
1985, The Guardian. October 2nd, 1985 p.6.
127 Liverpool Council, controlled by the Militant
Tendency, had placed itself on a direct collision course with
the Thatcher government's attempt to limit spending by local
government. Rather than attempt to solve the city's financial
crisis, the leadership chose to challenge the government by
making redundant most of the city's employees. Ultimately the
council was forced to back down, due to the determination of
the government and the lack of support for the council's
methods.
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away from extreme and impractical policies.

In November the

NEC agreed to an investigation into the Liverpool party, which
recommended bringing charges for breaches in party rules.

In

February 1986 the NEC suspended the Liverpool Constituency
Labour Party (CLP) .128
Those on the hard left, but not part of the Militant
Tendency, attacked the moves as a general attempt to discredit
the left.

In part it probably was.

While legal challenges to

the expulsions and other actions against Militant did follow,
resulting in the creation of a new disciplinary system, and
the National Constitutional Committee, a great blow against
the Militant Tendency was struck.

The challenge was in itself

vital, but even more important, it was the key in signalling
the beginning of the shift to the right.

Kinnock realized

that if Labour was again to be a significant electoral force,
modernization needed to come, not only in term of defeating
the hard left but equally in terms of the party's image.

The

Militant threat may have been greatly reduced and the party
set on a rightward path, but the public image of the party had
to be reformed prior to the 1987 election.
Given the ridicule of Michael Foot in 1983129, strong

128 Eric Shaw, Discipline and Discord in the Labour Party.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, chapter 9.
129 Throughout the campaign Foot was subject of attacks
from the Tory press on his inadequacy as a prime-minister.
His public standing in relation to the other party leaders
left his as the first choice of only 13% as the best candidate
for head of government.
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leadership was needed.

Kinnock had increasingly provided

this, but the fact that his personal standing in opinion polls
remained

significantly

lower than the other major party

leaders suggests that, in terms of public perception, it was
in this area that he was least successful.

The presentation

of a far more professional image was also required.

The

demonstration of Kinnock's success in achieving this came in
the 1987 election campaign, but from his election in 1983 he
had made a priority of it.

For example, during the 1984/5

miner's strike Kinnock kept a continual distance from National
Union of Mineworkers (NUM) leader Arthur Scargill and refused
to identify closely with his strategy, which at times involved
law breaking.

The NUM called for a future Labour government

to reinstate sacked miners, review the cases of jailed miners,
and reimburse fines. Kinnock refused to make such commitments.
A new moderate

image of the party

leadership was being

cultivated.
The 1987 Election Campaign.
The short-campaign run by Labour in the weeks prior to
the June 1987 ballot was the most professional seen in the
modern communications era.
carefully planned,

Each day of the campaign was

with different

opportunities for each day.

sound bites

and photo

By the end of the campaign

commentators universally proclaimed Labour's campaign the best
of the three major parties, with it being professionally
organized and run.

Despite this, Labour suffered its second
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worse defeat ever.

1987 had been a triumph in terms of image

but not in terms of substance.130
had been minimal.

Policy changes since 1983

Extreme elements such as withdrawal from

the EEC, had vanished, but Labour's program offered little
break from a traditional socialist approach.

While the party

had been reformed from within with the factional move to the
right, no time had been left for a radical change in external
policies.

On

defence

and

the

economy

Labour

remained

extremely vulnerable, with "Kinnock and his team knowing that,
for all their pre-campaign effort, the edifice of the Labour
Party

had

only

really

been

redecorated,

and

moderately

refurbished. "131
With another substantial electoral defeat in 1987 many on
the hard left believed they could undermine the revisionist
strategy.

This proved not to be the case.

strengthened his grip on the party.

Kinnock only

The conclusions reached

from the 1987 defeat were that more reforms were required, not
less.

Hughes and Wintour write, "It was impossible for any

remotely thoughtful party member to avoid concluding that the
party had this time fallen down on policy.... Labour was outof-date and out of line with people's most strongly felt
aspirations."132

The

result

of

the

1987

defeat

was

ultimately to re-energize the modernization process and allow
130 Hughes and Wintour,p. 3.
131 Ibid. , p. 28 .
132 Ibid. , p. 3.

sweeping policy changes.

CHAPTER VI
External Reform, 1987-1992.
The

period

from

1983-1987

found

the

Labour

Party

reforming internal elements of its behavior, while externally
presenting a new image.

The beginning of the modernization

process came about as a result of changing factional control
within the party.

The left of the party split, isolating the

hard left which had previously been the driving force of
policy through its strength at the constituency and conference
levels.

Up to 1987, the Kinnock leadership saw a moderation

in the type of factional control, with the fresh alliance of
soft left and right producing change.
1987 were of a far more

Policy reforms from

extensive nature than anything

witnessed in the earlier period.

The agenda adopted moved the

whole of the Labour Party considerably along the political
spectrum.

Long-term principles were dropped in the search for

electoral success.

The party appeared to be undertaking a

classic Downsian approach.
This chapter seeks to explore the policy changes during
this period, and explains just why they occurred.

It reaches

the conclusion that the leadership did not pursue a Downsian
electoral

strategy

but

largely

established Thatcherite agenda.
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responded to the

already
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Policy Reforms— Responding to the Thatcherite Agenda.
Labour's major policy review was instigated at the 1987
party conference,
defeat,

with

following a third consecutive

very

little

fanfare.

Review

election

groups

were

established, at the initiation of the leadership, to examine
policy in areas such as industry, including public ownership,
wealth creation,
services.133

economic and social equality and public

Enthusiasm amongst

conference delegates was

minimal, but after a third electoral defeat they were not
going to be the ones to stop a new initiative before it had
even begun, although they held out little hope of success.
In the months following the establishment of the review
procedure,
direction.

the

Kinnock

leadership

appeared to

lose much

Neil Kinnock personally doubted his ability to

lead his party through an extended period of reform, while
simultaneously facing a fresh assault from the left.

Having

completed four years in office, Kinnock realized that his
party still had a mountain to climb before real hopes of
electability returned.

Following the crushing defeat of 1987,

further setbacks were suffered in by-elections during 1988
which left many questioning Kinnock's future as leader.
A direct challenge to his position was launched by hard
left stalwart Tony Benn.

Although he had little chance of

success, a strong showing for the man who claimed Labour was

133Hughes and Wintour, p. 42
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suffering an identity crisis due to "the watering down of
basic principles,"134 would have severely wounded the leader.
Even more dangerous was the challenge by Benn's ally, John
Prescott, for the position of deputy leader.
had

always

symbolized

the

right-wing

of

Roy Hattersley
the

represented the new direction being undertaken.

party

and

A defeat for

him, feared as a real possibility, would have been a firm
rebuke for any extensive policy reform.
These challenges from Benn and Prescott represented the
renewed

factional

battles which occur

following external

defeat.

However, in 1988 a further factional shift did not

occur because Kinnock had improved Labour's showing in 1987,
and also had established a strong alliance of support inside
the party with his reforms from 1983-87.
Against Tony Benn, Kinnock collected 88% of the votes.
The hard left no longer wielded major influence inside the
party.

Benn won only 18.8% of the constituency vote, formerly

the left's stronghold, producing a humiliating defeat which
only

strengthened

Kinnock.135

Similarly,

Roy

Hattersley

solidly defeated his main challenger136 with a 66.8% to 23.7%
victory.

Hattersley collected over 60% of the constituency

vote. The leadership duo were given a vote of confidence from

134 Tony Benn, reported in Hughes and Wintour, p. 79.
135 Hughes and Wintour, p.86.
136 A third candidate, Eric Heffer, also entered the
deputy contest but was able to garner only 9% of the ballot.
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all levels of the party.
With this renewed level of authority, the way had been
cleared for pressing ahead with the policy review.

A much

tighter policy-making system was now in existence, with a
shadow-cabinet/NEC alliance dominating the process, rather
than

haphazard

efforts

from

conference.

Groups

were

established for reviewing policy areas, each handpicked by
Kinnock.

These were designed to produced the outcome he

desired, while simultaneously allowing voices of dissent to be
heard, enhancing unity.137
The culmination of these efforts came in the publication
of "Social Justice and Economic Efficiency, First report of
Labour's Policy Review for the 1990s." This comprised reports
from seven review groups, reports which were to act as the
launching pad for the new party policies in the early 1990s.
The publication saw the party's

first acceptance of the

importance of the market, so vital to the philosophy of Mrs.
Thatcher.

It explained how the market was able to bring,

"competition,
choice."138

stimulate

innovation

and

widen

consumer

Such language had never been seen in socialist

publications of the past.

With the market being so prominent

in Conservative ideology, Labour was clearly responding to the
direction undertaken by the government, rather than plotting

137 Ibid.
138 The Labour Party, Social Justice
Efficiency. London: Labour Party, 1988, p.4.

and

Economic

Ill

its own path.

In the area of social ownership the same

pattern was found.
change

as

it

The document provided the root for future

conceded

that

government

ownership

appropriate only in certain circumstances.
regard

to the

European Community

different from the past.

the

was

Likewise, with

language

was very

Gone was the commitment to withdraw,

and while the document remained skeptical about agricultural
policy and the single market, the battle with Europe was now
from within the Community.
This document provided only the basis on which future
substantial changes were built.
great

as

undertaken.
electoral

it

signalled

the

Its importance, though, is

new

policy

direction

to

be

The direction was to the right in search of
success,

with

a

shadowing

of

Conservative

philosophy.
Having achieved this start, Kinnock was now free to
embark on a fresh stage of reforms in 1989.

To appreciate

these changes, and the influence of the Conservatives, three
key policy areas

are now examined.

Labour's policy on

taxation, nationalization and industrial strategy and defence
all metamorphosized under Neil Kinnock.
Policy Reform 1989-1992— Taxation.
Democratic socialism developed during the post-war period
operating

on the principle

of redistribution

of

income.

Through a progressive tax system the income and wealth of the
better off in society would be redirected by government in
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support of the poor.

The tax policy operated by the last

Labour government reflected such a belief with a top income
tax

bracket

of

83%,

as

well

as

no

limits

on

national

insurance.
It was this tax policy that the Conservatives attacked in
the 1979 election.

The policy was stifling all incentives for

the wealthiest in society to work.

If this sector of the

workforce did not work, so the Conservatives claimed, then
jobs and prosperity would not be created further down the
financial ladder.

Tax rates in Britain were also penalizing

middle and working class groups, as a base rate of 33% stifled
consumer spending.

From the outset Mrs.Thatcher pledged to

cut taxation.
In reality the Thatcher and Lawson tax cutting program
was never as great as promised.

While income tax levels were

drastically cut, leaving only a two-tier system of 25 and 40%,
indirect regressive taxes were increased.
definite shift away from personal,

However, with this

direct taxation,

from

taxing income to taxing consumption, a new agenda had been
set.

The penal levels of income tax espoused by Labour until

1987 were no longer electorally acceptable.

This was made

painfully clear to Labour during the 1987 election campaign as
Neil Kinnock disclosed that those earning over £15,000 p.a.
would be worse off when Tory tax cuts were

reversed.139

Given this concession the Conservatives were able to launch a
139 See The Times. June 5th, 1987, p.l.
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savage attack as Chancellor Lawson claimed 22 million people
would be worse off under Labour's tax proposals.140

The

Prime Minister claimed Labour's spending plans would need a
basic rate of income tax at 54% or VAT (value added tax) at
50%.
Such claims were undoubtedly exaggerated but the mud did
stick.

Labour's history had tarred them with a brush of high

taxation.

The leadership knew this shackle must be broken but

faced a conundrum.

As Hughes and Wintour put it, they "had to

frame a tax policy for Labour which would achieve the party's
redistributive aims, while assuaging voters fears that Labour
would place both the national economy and their own families
in tax servitude.1,143
The challenge to Labour was to find a balance.

Such an

attempt was first produced in May 1989 after a sweeping NEC
policy review.

Although Labour promised to return to the

progressive principle so greatly undermined by the Thatcher
governments, in announcing a 50% ceiling on income tax they
vowed not to, "return to the high and marginal rates of tax
which

occurred

Labour

pledged

in the
to

past."144

abolish

limits

Simultaneously,
on

national

though,
insurance

contributions, which effectively meant a further 9% on the top
tax band.
140 Ibid.
143 Hughes and Wintour,p. 139 .
144 See The Guardianr May 8th, 1989, p. 2.
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This policy remained through to the 1992 election.

For

Labour it always proved to be a balancing act— respond to the
Thatcherite

agenda

of

tax

cuts

or

remaining

redistributive and spending principles.
1987

pledges

of

substantially

loyal

to

In comparison to the

increasing

income

tax and

introducing a wealth tax, the policy of 1992 was a radical
change.
Nationalization and Industrial Strategy.
Analysts identify the Labour government of 1945-1951 as
the party's most successful ever.

Dominant in this government

was the period 1945 to 1948 when the party introduced radical,
long-term changes to the British economy.
program of nationalization was

A wide-ranging

embarked upon,

witnessing

government purchase of industries such as coal, rail, and
later iron and steel.

From this time on many of Labour's

economic proposals centered on the extension of government
control

as

a

means

of

economic

were

attacked

growth

and

wealth

redistribution.
These

principles

Conservative Party.

by

the

Thatcher-led

Its new economic agenda of the 1980s saw

the market as the central element.

A privatization program

was embarked upon which saw the sale of industries such as
British Telecom,

British Airways, the water industry, the

Central Electricity Generating Board and British Gas.

The

period of extensive government ownership was over.
In 1983 Labour was fully committed to renationalization,
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and a further extension of government control.
party's

1987

manifesto

did

not

Although the

detail

a

massive

nationalization program, Kinnock openly admitted that he saw
a long-term extension of social ownership once the economic
climate allowed.
that

in

the

During the election campaign he explained

manifesto

he

had

set

out,

"to

lower

his

sights...because of the parlous state of the economy and
public

services...[However]

it

is

necessary

to

get

the

participation on behalf of the people by the government in the
organization, ownership and control of industry."145
The party was remaining loyal to its economic principles,
but the Thatcher agenda demanded attention to the concerns of
small business and the freedom of the market.
reforms since 1989 have reflected this.
industrial
Britain.1

strategy
It

in the

explained

Labour's policy

The party set out its

1991 publication

how,

"government

'Opportunity

must

work

in

partnership with industry to modernize the British economy.
The old ideologies— command economy at the one extreme, crude
free market economies at the other— have no credibility."146
Labour's proposal was for cooperation with industry,

not

control, and two-way consultation, not three-way including the
trade unions.

Later in the year the policy document 'Modern

manufacturing

strength,' saw the party

commit

itself to

145 Neil Kinnock, reported in The Times. June 2nd, 1987,
p. 1.
146 The Labour Party, Opportunity Britain. Labour's better
wav for the 1990s. London: Labour Party, 1991, p.4.
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capitalist style policies with promises of corporate tax
allowances for investment and the possibility of individuals
being able to set investment in business against taxation.147

The policy reforms meant that the party no longer saw an
important

role

for government

in owning and

controlling

industry.

Private investment and profit would be encouraged

with modern government having a "role, not to replace the
market but to ensure that the market works properly."148
Defence.
Since the late 1950s the party had fought

internal

battles over the direction of defence policy— unilateral or
multilateral?

With the left securing control of the party in

the early 1980s a strongly unilateral stance was taken.
Unfortunately for Labour this was done at a time when the
Thatcher government had placed defence policy at the center of
British politics.

The Falklands war had combined with the

'new1 cold war to make defence a key issue at the 1983 ballot.
The then defence secretary, Michael Heseltine, launched his
party's

campaign

unilateral
States,

with

claims

that

Labour's

policy

of

nuclear disarmament would alienate the United

tip the balance of power to the USSR and,

"thus

dangerously raise the risk that the Soviet Union might be
147 See The Labour Party, Modern manufacturing strength.
London: Labour Party, 1991, p.7.
148 The Labour Party, It's time to get Britain working
again. London: Labour Party, 1992, p.11.
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tempted towards the military adventurism in Europe that NATO
stopped in the 1940s."149
Throughout the campaign the Conservatives attacked Labour
for what Mrs.Thatcher called a policy that was "desperately
and dangerously wrong."150
had

decreased by

remained.

1987,

Although international tensions
the weakness

of

Labour's

policy

Only 28% of the electorate supported Labour's

stance and under half of the party's own identifiers favored
the position.151
The strong Conservative stance on defence, insisting on
the maintenance of a full nuclear deterrent and a leading role
in the NATO alliance, had contrasted to such an extent with
Labour's policy as to leave them in an impossible position.
Once again Labour responded with an end to the commitment of
unilateralism in May 1989.

Neil Kinnock explained that

unilateralism was "not even comprehended by those who share
our objectives in other countries.

They cannot understand our

position of conceding nuclear weapons without getting anything
in return."152

149 Michael Heseltine, reported in The Guardian. May 13th,
1983, p.2.
150 Mrs. Thatcher, reported The Guardian. May 27th, 1987,
p.l.
151 Figures from Miller et al. How voters change. The 1987
British General Election campaign in perspective. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990, pp.51-54.
152 Neil Kinnock,
1989, p.8.

reported in The Guardian. May 10th,
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Downsian policy reform?
Examination of these three policy areas demonstrates that
the

new policies

developed

by the

Labour

reflection of the Thatcherite agenda.

Party were

a

It would be wrong to

conclude, however, that these policy reforms represented a
Downsian approach.

Labour developed policies to mimic the

Conservative success, not find the consensus center of British
politics.

The Conservatives policies under Mrs. Thatcher

never sought to find the political consensus.

As Crewe and

Searing explain, "Mrs. Thatcher won despite the unpopularity
of her own ideology."153
In 1987 support for Thatcherite policy positions was
minimal.

Only

13% supported more tax cuts rather than

increased social services, 14% believed price control should
take

priority

over

job

creation

and

25%

accepted

the

"illegitimacy of the trade unions."154
If

BES

cross

sectional

surveys

on the electorate's

attitude to key policy areas are also considered,
change can be identified during the 198 0s.155
the

percentage

agreeing

that

the

little

For example,

government

should

redistribute income in favor of the less well-off fluctuated
only from 54% in October 1974 to 50% in 1987.

The percentage

believing the government should spend more to defeat poverty
153 Crewe and Searing, p. 378.
154 Figures from Crewe and Searing, p. 376.
155 Heath, et al. p. 175.
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rose from 84% to 86% over the same period, while between 1979
and 1987 those believing that more money should be put in to
the National Health Service (NHS) increased from 87 to 90%.
Over this same period those believing the government should
privatize some state held companies, a central Thatcherite
economic policy,

fell from 38% to 31%.

Data continue to

suggest little evidence of the electorate moving right to any
great extent since 1974 or 1979.
Mrs. Thatcher's position was clearly not at the political
center,

but

it was these policy positions that Labour's

reforms followed.

In a conclusion that clearly reflects

Labour's actions, Crewe and Searing write, "Politicians are
most

likely

to

adjust

electorates...when

the

their

ideologies

victorious

to

opponents

appeal

to

ideology

is

thought to be popular."156
The policy reforms undertaken by Labour since 1987 have
placed the party further right than ever before.

This is not

because the party has been searching for center ground, but
because

it

was

responding

to

a

successful

Thatcherite

electoral stance.
During this period Labour carried out policy reform to an
unprecedented level.

Never before had a party in Britain

carried out such a comprehensive change in policy direction.
The reasons for these changes were three-fold.

First, the

left had gradually lost influence within the party since the
156 Crewe and Searing, p. 378.
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general election humiliation of 1983.

This was ultimately

confirmed by the challenges to Kinnock and Hattersley in 1988,
which demonstrated the lack of support for the left at all
levels of the party.

Second, the factional change which

accompanied the decline meant a corresponding rise in policies
looking

in

a

moderate

direction.

Finally,

and

most

significantly, was the desire of the leadership and the party
for a return to power.

Once the leadership had survived

factional challenges following the 1987 defeat, policy reforms
were introduced shadowing the Conservative policy direction.
In electoral terms Mrs.Thatcher was the most successful Tory
leader of the 20th century.

In an attempt to defeat her, the

Labour leadership sacrificed their own principles to her
policy agenda.

CHAPTER VII
1992— READY FOR GOVERNMENT?
The final episode in the story of the successful reform
and modernization of the Labour party, should tell the tale of
a return to power.

The election of April 1992 shattered the

hopes of a fairy-tale ending when the Conservatives won a
shock

fourth

consecutive

term.

Neil

Kinnock

had

been

successful in reforming his party internally, but externally
it still faced up to substantial defeat at the ballot box.
This chapter explores events prior to the vote, all of
which appeared to indicate a Kinnock premiership.

It asks why

did Labour only improve their performance to the extent that
it still ranked as their third worst in the modern era.

The

Conservatives were in a far weaker position than at any
previous election, and so this defeat for Labour threatened to
be more damaging than any of the previous three.

Had the

modernization process all been in vain?
The Conservative Government 1987-1992.
A brief consideration of the previous five years of Tory
government finds a party ripe for removal from office.

Their

triumph in the 1987 election was followed by more of the
Lawson boom.

Consumer spending continued at record levels,

but severe economic miscalculations had been made at the
central level.

With the economy fuelled up for the election
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success of 1987, after the election it was time to 'take the
steam out' or slow down the economy.

A continuation at such

a high level of consumer extravagance would only store up
rapid inflation for the future.
state of the economy,

The government misread the

choosing to inject money into the

economy following the stock market crash of October 1987.
This only fuelled up the real economy to a greater extent.
Consumer spending was further encouraged by the Chancellor's
policy of shadowing the Deutsche Mark, which required the
maintenance of low British interest rates.

More tax cuts in

1988 created greater enjoyment of the short-term boom, but by
1989 the economic consequences were being felt.
During 1989 the surge of inflation to levels over 9%, was
accompanied by hikes in interest rates to attempt to control
the rise.
These

The reduction of inflation was sought at all costs.

costs

proved

to be

severely damaging

to

consumer

confidence, the housing market, and the manufacturing sector.
The high interest rates,
remaining

peaking at a level of 15% but

consistently over

10%

from

1989

rendered spending and investment impossible.

through

1992,

Britain was left

in its longest post-war recession.
While economic issues were always present in the thoughts
of Conservative backbench MPs as they watched the slide in
support for their party in opinion polls, it was two other
issues which pushed them into removing Mrs.Thatcher as party
leader and prime-minister. First came the Community Charge,
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or Poll Tax, as it became commonly known.

This was a Thatcher

brain-child designed to introduce greater accountability at
the local government level.

Each citizen over the age of 18

would be responsible for paying the charge, in some cases at
levels over £600 a year.157

Huge numbers of people faced

bills far higher than they previously paid under the rating
system.158 The fact that the Poll Tax was a flat rate charge
meant it had a highly regressive impact.
The goal of the new tax had been to make left-wing local
councils more accountable for their high levels of spending.
When the local electorates realized the high charges they
faced,

the high spending councils would be held directly

responsible in local elections.

The actual impact was to

create a level a of hostility towards the government, and
towards Mrs. Thatcher especially, of unprecedented intensity.
The Poll Tax crisis,

combined with the effect of growing

recession

resignation

and

Chancellor159

to

the

cause

a

plunge

of
in

Nigel
support

Lawson
for

as
the

157 Certain reductions were available to groups on income
support or students but all were responsible for at least some
payment.
158 Under the rating system contributions to local
authority income were paid according to the level of income a
house would earn if rented out.
Only the head of the
household was responsible for payment.
159 In the fall of 1989 Nigel Lawson resigned from the
cabinet following a public dispute with Mrs.Thatcher over the
direction of economic policy. In November of that year she
faced the first ever challenge to her position as leader from
backbench MP Sir Anthony Meyer. While having no hope of
victory Meyer was representative of growing unrest within the
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government.

By Spring 1990 the Conservatives were 25% behind

Labour in the opinion polls.160
It was during 1990 that the second issue dividing the
party,

and curtailing Mrs.Thatcher1s support,

emerged. As

prime-minister she had always been skeptical about closer
political union through the European Community, but towards
the end of 1990 she became increasingly aggressive and rude in
public to her European counterparts.161

The consequence of

her stance was to provoke the resignation of Sir Geoffrey Howe
as the Deputy Prime Minister.

He viciously attacked the Prime

Minister, claiming she was dividing the party and destroying
any future electoral hopes.
former

defense

secretary

With the party in disarray,
Michael

Mrs.Thatcher for the party leadership.

Heseltine

challenged

The final result was

her removal from the position of leader and her replacement by
the then chancellor, John Major.
The growth of Mrs.Thatcher1s personal unpopularity, and
the dominance of Labour in the opinion polls, had forced her
from office.

Had the Conservatives chosen to continue with

party.
160 See Gallup poll for The Daily Telegraph. April 6th,
1990, p.l.
161 At the Rome Conference of EC heads of government in
October 1990, she told the other eleven leaders that they were
living in "cloud cuckoo land" as plans for further union were
discussed. More significant than what Mrs.Thatcher said was
the abrasive manner she adopted, turning herself into a figure
of ridicule across Europe. See The Times. October 10th, 1990,
p.l.
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their leader of 15 years, Labour appeared guaranteed a return
to office.

As it was, the new prime-minister provided a

bounce for the government in the opinion polls.

A new policy

direction was undertaken, with most significantly the poll tax
being scratched.
Although the Conservatives held a narrow lead in opinion
polls during the early months of 1991, the state of the
economy prevented the prime-minister from calling an election.
Unemployment

continued

to

rise

to

levels

approaching

3

million, while interest rates continued to curtail industrial
investment and consumer spending.

By the summer of 1991

Labour had resecured its consistent lead in polls.

In the

months leading to the April 1992 ballot, Labour had a steady
4

point

lead

over

the

government.162

All

indicators

suggested, at worst, that Labour would become the largest
party in a hung parliament.

While the complete overturn of

the huge Conservative parliamentary majority in one effort was
always a daunting prospect, the continual disarray in the
party which had been present since 1990 gave Labour real hope.
Labour should indeed have had real hope.
power

for thirteen years,

Having been in

the Conservatives went to the

country with the economy still in deep recession, following a
government of continual confusion.

With such a situation the

main opposition party should have been ready to replace them.

162 Figures from The Sunday Times
12th, 1992.

poll of polls, April

126

Labour should have won the 1992 general election.

They did

not.
Examining Labour's Defeat.
More fortuitous circumstances for Labour could not have
been imagined than those enjoyed at the time of the 1992 vote.
However, the electorate rejected Neil Kinnock's "new party" in
a manner similar to

its left-wing predecessors.

Labour

collected only 35.2% of the popular vote, an increase of 4
points over 1987 but hugely disappointing for the party.

John

Major's Conservatives were returned to office with over 14
million votes, a 42.8%, share and a 21 seat majority over all
other parties.

The Tories secured an emphatic 336 to 271 seat

victory over Labour, comfortably leaving them as the largest
party in the Commons.
Has Labour a future in its present form, now that its
reformed version has been whole-heartedly rejected? Although
they did manage a further increase in their share of the vote,
they have still to return to their 1979 level of 37% let alone
their 1970 level of 40.2%.

In the midst of a recession and

with a campaign universally regarded as badly organized, the
Conservatives won a fourth successive term, the first such
victory since 1827.

As one commentator explained, "If you

examine Labour's share of the poll since 1945, it is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that we are witnessing a remorseless
decline in the Labour vote, with 1992 marking but a blip when
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circumstances

were

particularly

favourable.1,163

Some

of

Labour's leading figures, most notably the then deputy leader,
Roy Hattertsley, argued that in the depth of recession the
electorate were frightened of change, preferring the devil
they knew.

Such a claim, that the electorate is more selfish

at a time of recession,

and therefore avoids a possibly

redistributive government, fails to ring true. In 1987 Labour
explained away the size of its defeat by claiming that the
Lawson boom had won the Conservatives votes.

This was true.

To claim now that the Lamont recession aided the government is
absurd.

The Clinton Democratic victory in the 1992 American

Presidential race demonstrated that when the electorate judges
that a better alternative exists it will remove an incumbent.
The explanations of Labour's defeat go far deeper than this.
If Labour is to have a long-term future it must first
examine the immediate reasons for its defeat and then consider
its long-term direction.

In 4 years time, or whenever the

next general election is called, Labour will face the added
problem of reapportionment.

The Boundary Commission changes

will provide the Conservatives with at least an additional 10,
and as many as 20, new seats in the south of England.164

A

163 See Martin Jaques in The Sunday Times. April 19th
1992, p.5. Jaques is the former editor of Marxism Today.
164 The Boundary Commission is responsible for the
redrawing of electoral boundaries in Britain according to
population shifts.
With the growth in population in the
Conservative stronghold south, seats are likely to be
reapportioned to these areas. Labour are the likely losers of
reapportionment with the decline in population in industrial
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Labour victory under the current voting system will require a
greater swing to the left at the next election than occurred
in 1992 due to the boundary changes.165

To achieve this the

party must begin by correcting the faults of 1992.
Neil Kinnock.
Blake

Morrison

writes

of

Kinnock,

"Perhaps

his

achievements in reforming the party made him a John the
Baptist or Gorbachev figure, preparing the way for others,
rather than as a prime-minister."166

Without ever leading

his party into office, Neil Kinnock*s term of leadership must
be regarded as one of the most successful ever.

He has

created a new party within the party's original structure.
The policy

reforms

of

1987

to

1992 made

Labour a true

alternative.
However, Kinnock may have been partly responsible for the
defeat.
material.

His public image was never one of prime-ministerial
Constantly attacked by the Tory press as a 'wind

bag', he struggled with a personal credibility problem.

This

was then compounded by Labour strategists who chose to run a
campaign in the US Presidential style.

Kinnock was central to

the campaign, which may only have enhanced public suspicions
of

him.

Over-confidence

was

continually

in

existence,

areas, Labour strongholds.
165 See The Guardian. April 11th, 1992, p. 3.
166 Blake Morrison The Independent. April 12th,
p.17.
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reaching a pinnacle at the Sheffield rally in the final days
of the campaign.

Kim Howells, the Labour MP for Pontypidd

explains, "This absurd triumphalism and pompous music, all
this glitz got in the way.

Not only were we counting chickens

before they were hatched, we were acting as if we were the
government already."167

The Kinnocks were presented as if

living in Downing Street already, when Labour needed to be
emphasizing a competent team for government.
Miscalculations were also made during the campaign in
relation to policy emphasis.

Rather than making a total

attack on the Conservatives1 mishandling of the economy and
fully exploiting this weakness, Labour concentrated on issues
on which they felt strong.

The state of the national health

service and the quality of state education were both central
to the Labour platform.

They were, indeed, areas in which

Labour was strong, but were not issues by which they were
likely to gain additional support.

Voters determining their

selection on the health or education issue were already likely
to have selected Labour.

Further to this, issues such as the

national health service might only to be salient with those
directly affected.

The vast majority of the electorate may

not consider the state of the service until they are actually
ill.

Of far more concern to the bulk of the country is the

state of the economy and their own personal finances.

167 See Kim Howells The Guardian.

April 13th, 1992, p.3.
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Public fear and Labour's past
Although Kinnock had been successful in modernizing the
party, Martin Jaques writes, "the Great Reformer himself was
inextricably tied to the past...his body language and rhetoric
a constant reminder of a bygone era, that of the south Wales
valleys and the mining communities."168 The electorate still
distrusts a Labour government, due to the party's socialist
past.

During the campaign the Conservatives continually

produced negative images of what Labour in power would mean.
High levels of taxation, high levels of inflation,
return to union power were all threatened.

and a

Memories of the

1974-79 government and the "Winter of Discontent" were again
resurrected.

While the images were overtly negative, they

were sufficient to cast doubts in the mind of the electorate.
To

counteract

such

challenges

in

the

future,

the

modernized Labour party needs to openly distance itself from
the past.

A repudiation of the last Labour government is now

needed from a leadership team that holds almost no association
with it.

To break from the past Labour must do more than

change. It must directly state to the electorate that it has
indeed changed.

Half-hearted defenses of past Labour policy

and actions must end, so preventing the current party being
savaged by the Conservatives for days long gone.
Labour also suffered from its long established ties with

168 See Martin Jaques The Sunday Times. April 19th, 1992,
p. 5.
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the unions.

The block vote

the unions wield

at party

conference and in selection of the party leader enhance the
image of Labour as the party of the unions.

The Conservatives

again played upon public fears, claiming that a return of
Labour to power would mean a return of the union stranglehold
on the British economy.
The Press
Immediately following the election result, Neil Kinnock
publicly lambasted the Tory press for greatly enhancing his
party's

prospects

of defeat.

The

Whitty

report,169 the

party's own investigation into its defeat, also stressed the
significance of press attacks.
valid.

Such criticisms are indeed

Throughout the final campaign the bulk of the popular

press actively supported the Conservatives.
savage attacks were launched.

In the final days

On polling day, April 9th, The

Sun's front page was covered by the statement "Will the last
person

to

leave

should Labour win.

Britain

please

turn

out

the

lights,"170

This was followed by attacks upon both

Kinnock and Labour throughout the edition.

Similarly, The

Daily Mail's banner headline was simply 'Warning.,171

The

Paper then proceeded to warn that if Labour were elected a
sterling crisis would follow within days,

accompanied by

169 This investigation was chaired by party general
secretary Larry Whitty and published in June of 1992.
170 See The Sun. April 9th, 1992, p.l.
171 See The Daily Mail. April 9th, 1992, p.l.
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higher interest rates.

The combined circulation of these two

tabloids is six million.
Criticism of the press coverage may be valid, but the
press must be seen as only a minor contributing factor.

There

attacks were no different from attacks on previous Labour
leaders.

Their impact comes into question as the majority

garner their information from the largely impartial television
news coverage.

Similarly, those reading the Tory tabloids

probably are Conservative supporters to begin with.
Labour's Tax Proposals.
Even when competing against a party which had lost its
reputation for economic competence, it was Labour which was
placed on the defensive in the final stages of the campaign.
The tax proposals of the party had been published by Shadow
Chancellor John Smith, soon after the election was called.
Labour was proposing a top income tax bracket of 50%, a 10%
increase.

Additionally, and possibly fatally, it planned to

remove the ceiling on National Insurance Contributions. This
effectively meant a highest tax band of 59%.
Although Labour's proposals were in no way as punitive as
previous plans, the Conservatives attacked them as traditional
high tax socialist policies.

Fear again played a significant

role, especially in the South where Labour had to make strong
gains.

As one Labour MP explains, "We never really addressed

southern England and other wealthy parts of the country.

The

assumption that somehow our tax policy would be accepted by
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large

numbers

of people

in these areas was

always very

questionable.11172
Labour had argued that only those with incomes over
£21,000 p.a. would be affected.

While this level is well

above the average income, many of the middle-class voters
whose

support Labour needed for victory

levels.

aspired to such

Conservative style values and hopes for the future

had not changed, even in a recession.

As shadow cabinet

member Brian Gould argued, "There is no doubt that our tax
proposals appeared to set a cap on people's aspiration,
particularly in the south of England, where we need especially
to attract support."173

Pocket-book decisions had combined

with general economic expectations to severely weaken Labour
in an area where they had to make substantial ground.174
Labour is left facing a conundrum over future tax policy.
If it

is to finance spending programs taxes will haveto be

raised, but for the party to

be elected an electorate which

will have enjoyed over 15 years of lower personal tax rates
will have to be won over.
When tax policy is combined with the fear associated with
the Labour past, the lack of Neil Kinnock's personal appeal,

172 Kim Howells in The Guardian. April 13th, 1992, p.3.
173 Brain Gould, then shadow environment spokesman,
writing in The Sunday Times. April 19th, 1992, p.4.
174 See David Sanders, "Why the Conservative Party WonAgain." A. King (ed) , Britain at the Polls 1992. New York:
Chatham House, 1993.
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and the failings in Labour's campaign strategy, explanations
for the party's defeat can be found.

They are indeed failings

which can be corrected by the party in its present form.

If

they are to be corrected the only way is for the party to
continue down the path Kinnock began.
Events following the election do suggest this is the
direction the party had undertaken.
Theory,

a

resurface.
might

danger

existed

that

Under the Dual Advisory
internal

battles

could

With the right-led party again defeated, the left

have

rallied

socialist values.

support

for a return

to traditional

Such calls were largely muted, however.

Left-wing stalwarts, such as Ken Livingstone and Bernie Grant,
did claim that Labour had failed because the alternative
offered

had

not

been

sufficiently

left-wing.175

The

majority, though, even on the left supported a continuation of
the Kinnock direction.

Traditionally left-wing MP Austin

Mitchell, of Greater Grimsby, illustrated this as he called
for a policy of "steady as she goes"176 When the right-wing
candidate, John Smith,

secured a landslide victory in the

party's June leadership ballot it appeared that this was
exactly what the party had done.177
175 See The Independent. April 12th, 1992, p.17.
176 See Austin Mitchell The Guardian. April 11th, 1992,
p.3 where he issued his call for the party to continue in the
direction Kinnock had begun.
177 In the June ballot John Smith collected just over 91%
of the party's votes, with Brian Gould collecting only 8%. In
the deputy leadership contest, Margaret Beckett was triumphant
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The reason why the right-wing faction has survived even
after a second defeat is that the party has once again
improved its position. The memories of 1983 are still fresh
enough to prevent a resurging left.

The controlling right-

wing of the party is still regarded as the most likely to
succeed.

The feeling amongst the majority of the party is

that if the failings of the 1992 campaign are corrected, the
personally popular John Smith can lead the party further down
the path Neil Kinnock set out, and possibly to success in 1996
or 1997.

As the Conservative Party continues to govern in

disarray,178 many

in the

Labour

Party

believe

that more

reforms could produce the one final push to return them to
power.

with 57.3% of the votes.
Brian Gould 14.5%.

John Prescott collected 28.2% and

178 From the time of their reelection the Conservative
government has lurched from one crisis to another.
The
economy has stubbornly remained in deep recession, Britain has
been forced to withdraw from the Exchange Rate Mechanism of
the EC, the government has made a U-turn of proposed pit
closures in the face of huge public pressure and the primeminister threatened to resign over a possible to failure to
ratify the Maastricht treaty on further European Union. John
Major has replaced his predecessor as the most unpopular
prime-minister since polling began, and his ability to lead
the government has been severely questioned.

CHAPTER VIII
LABOUR'S FUTURE

To ensure a return to government the Labour Party must
make further changes, both within its internal structure and
at its external policy level.

In concluding the previous

chapter it was suggested that these changes may well be within
the reach of the party.

One more push from the 1992 result

and the Conservatives could be removed from office.

Labour

appear to be on the right track— steadily reversing the
Conservative majority from the disaster of 1983.
they?

But are

Is the truth actually, as Andrew Neil writes that

those, "who argue that Labour can win with just one more push
are whistling in the wind?

The harsh fact for Labour is that

the

1992

general

election

of

was

a

low point

for the

Tories.I|179
This chapter seeks to explore the long-term future of the
Labour Party in British politics, asking whether the political
obstacles facing Labour are higher than those suggested after
the 1992 election defeat.

Are the changes required far

greater than the cosmetic alterations previously suggested?

179 See editorial of Andrew Neil in The Sunday Times.
April 19th 1992 p.3. An almost identical editorial appeared
on page 17 of The Independent on June 16th 1992. It stated,
"To suggest that one more heave will suffice to shove Labour
back into power in 1996 or 1997, after four successive
defeats, is deeply unconvincing."
136
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The key issue which Labour must come to terms with, if
the party is ever to return to power in its present form, is
the size of the Conservative victory in 1992.

At a time of

nationwide economic recession, as opposed to being regionally
concentrated,

the

Conservatives

were

returned

with

a

comfortable majority in the Commons and a substantial nine
point margin over Labour in popular terms.180

In the South

of the country (except London) , where Labour must break the
almost absolute Tory grip on seats to win a national election,
Conservative support was even greater.

In the South East they

won a popular vote victory over Labour of 54.5% to 20.7%, and
in the South West of 47.6% to 31.4%.

By the time of the next

election, the Boundary Commission's work will have ensured
that these popular majorities translate into an even greater
number of seats.

These regions remained loyal Tory blue, even

at a time of hardship.

For them a bad Conservative government

offered more hope than a reformed Labour one.
The Conservatives seem to have an unshakable grip on at
least two-fifths of the electorate.181 The remainder is then
split between a divided opposition.

To break this Tory hold,

Labour must enter a further period of metamorphosis.
180 Although the Conservatives were returned to power in
1983 with much of the country facing economic hardship, the
South and South East, areas which provide the core Tory
support, never suffered to the same intensity.
In the
recession of 1992 it was these regions which were hit the very
hardest.
181 See David Marquand, The Guardian. April 11th, 1992,
p. 2.
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Tax, the campaign, the press, the leader and past fears
and prejudices have all been cited as reasons for Labour's
latest failures.

Martin Jaques concedes "Of course, these

were all factors, but any Labour politician who believes these
are the real reasons is engaged in an act of gross self
delusion."182

The Cl and C2 voters in the South of England

were not swayed by last minute campaign failings.

They have

become long-term Tory voters, in the way industrial areas used
to guarantee Labour a 40% share of the vote.

In 1992

conditions for Labour could not have been more advantageous,
but

they

still

failed.

Their

third

worst

electoral

performance since 19 31 must be seen as failure.
As Martin Jaques explains, "If you examine Labour's share
of

the

poll

since

1945,

it

is

difficult

to

avoid

the

conclusion that we are witnessing a remorseless decline in the
Labour vote, with 1992 marking a blip when circumstances were
peculiarly favorable."183
down the Kinnock path,
urgency.

Although the party is continuing
it is doing so without any great

Many are acting under the belief that cosmetic

policy changes and a charismatic leader will be enough.
may not be the case.

This

To win over the desperately needed

voters in the south of England, Labour needs to reinvent
itself to a similar extent as occurred under the Kinnock

182 Martin Jaques, The Sunday Times. April 19th, 1992,
p. 5.
183 Ibid.
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leadership.

In 1992 Labour did perforin well, but still lost.

Serious reexamination of the party's basic principles

is

needed.
The Labour Party was born out of industrialization and an
expanding working class.

It was built on the belief that the

masses were located at the bottom of the economic pyramid and
the wealthy at the top.

The party has failed to appreciate

that in the information age of the 1990s, British society is
more egg than pyramid shaped.184

While Labour has accepted

the need to expand its support beyond a working-class base,
the party has little real substance to offer in alternative to
the Conservatives.

The core of its policy agenda in 1992 was

social and redistributive issues, such as the health service
and income support.

While these are valid issues, the party

failed to comprehensively address the issue of wealth creation
which is vital if such plans are to be financed.
In seeking to create a distance from its roots, the party
has moved

away

from

its

traditional

socialist

ideology.

Attempts were made to compete with the Tories, as Labour moved
across

the

ideological

spectrum

in a seemingly

Downsian

fashion.

Labour's motion was unquestionably towards the

political

center,

Downsian strategy.

but

it was not,

however,

driven by a

Moving the party were changes in factional

control and the Kinnock leadership being forced to respond to
the agenda dictated by the Thatcher governments.
184 Ibid.
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Labour has been left in limbo.

It has abandoned its own

ideology in the search for success, but not replaced it.

As

Peter Kellner explains the only available ideology in modern
society is capitalism.185

Only when Labour fully embraces

this can the party hope to run a government creating enough
wealth

to

finance

its

social

programs.

Until

now

the

leadership has failed to do this, being "too scared of [the
party's]

past

to

say boldly

what

is

good

about modern

capitalism - and too scared of its opponents' orthodoxies to
say boldly what is bad."186

Labour must develop policies

specifically aimed at the creation of wealth in the private
sector, while using central government to gently fix the
failings of the system.

In shadowing the Thatcherite agenda

Kinnock began the process, but the party still has further to
travel.
If Labour is to achieve this it must begin by abandoning
its Clause Four commitment to public ownership.

Although the

party now pledges little expansion of public ownership, the
removal of the clause from the party constitution is vital to
signify the new direction the party is undertaking.

With this

as

a

a beginning,

socialist'187

the

party,

Labour
offering

Party must
a

become

radical

new

'post
'center'

185 See Peter Kellner in The Independent. July 19th, 1992,
p. 3 .
186 Ibid.
187 See Martin Jacques The Sunday Times. April 19th 1992
p. 5.
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alternative to the Tories.
To return to power these are the conclusions the party
may be forced to draw from the defeat of 1992.

The likelihood

is, however, that any such conclusions will not be drawn until
after the next general election.

With the quick selection of

John Smith as the new leader, without a real post mortem, the
party has signalled its intention to continue a Kinnock style
battle.

Smith will bring changes.

At the party's Fall 1992

conference the voting block of the unions was cut from 90 to
70%.

Plans are in existence to further reduce this.

Policies

will continue to change too, but not to a radical extent.
Demonstrating this, on being elected leader Smith proclaimed
that the party would embark,

"on a journey to persuade

millions of the strength of our vision, the relevance of our
policies, the urgency of our demand for change."188

Smith's

concern was still with the vision of Labour, rather than a
realization that the vision of many in the nation is of
capitalist wealth creation.
Labour's future and the Dual Advisory Theory.
Labour will continue in its present form and under its
present direction until the next general election.

The fourth

consecutive Tory victory has provoked talk of a possible
electoral pact between Labour and the Liberal Democrats to
defeat the Conservatives.

Proposals for such discussions were

188 John Smith reported in The Sunday Times. July 19th
1992, p.2.
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made at the Liberal conference of 1992, but little progress
was made.

Although leading figures in the Liberal Democrats

may tell Labour leaders they cannot defeat the Tories alone,
such claims appear to fall on deaf ears.

The speed with which

the party selected its new leader, and its almost unanimous
approval of him,

have guaranteed that Labour will fight on

against the Tories alone.

Their belief is that a Labour

majority can still be returned.
Internal relations in the Labour Party are likely to be
largely passive in the following years.

Disputes will occur,

for example over the direction of Labour's European policy,
but these will not be to an extent to divide the party
severely.

Labour will fight an almost continual election

campaign in the years ahead, united behind its leadership.
This unity will be in support of Labour's last throw of the
dice in its present form.

The party cannot survive a fifth

consecutive defeat.
Success in 1996 or 1997 would mean the continuation of
the two-party system in British politics for the foreseeable
future.

Defeat would force Labour to face up to the real

reasons for its defeats.

Despite the failings of the current

Conservative government, this must be treated as a distinct
possibility.
Without renouncing past Labour governments, the new party
can never be free of Conservative taunts, and the consequent
fears which accompany the possibility of a Labour government.
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To throw off these historic shackles Labour must fully embrace
capitalism and the private sector.
must be produced.
capitalized.

Radical growth proposals

The capitalist Conservatives must be out

Under Labour's present leadership this seems

highly unlikely, because a safe approach is sought.

As a

result the south of England will remain a Tory bedrock,
enhanced by the Boundary Commission.

With this as a base, the

Tories will easily collect the additional seats they require
to secure an overall Commons majority.
its best hope for a return to power.

1992 offered Labour

The Conservatives could

not be so incompetent as to offer Labour such an opportunity
again.
Without

major

changes

Labour

consecutive defeat in the face.

is

staring

a

fifth

The impact of such a defeat

on the party would be a reawakening of internal conflict.

The

left would pull for a return to a socialist approach, while
the new right would call for a repositioning of the party,
possibly even right of center.
further

series

of

internal

division of the party.

The likely consequence of a

disputes

would be

the

fatal

An electoral pact with the Liberals

could well be formed, ultimately forcing a change in the
British electoral system and the introduction of proportional
representation.

Such a change would guarantee that Labour

divided into at least two parties.
The period since 1974 has seen Labour carry out much
movement along the political spectrum.

In the period from
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1979 to 1983 the party's policy changes encompassed a rapid
move to the left.

Downs' belief that parties sought the

political equilibrium at all times was shown not to be the
case.

Internal factions determined the direction the party

would take in external relations.
The

Kinnock

period

could

easily

demonstration of Downsian behavior.

be

seen

as

a

This was not the case.

The direction of the party was determined by,

first, the

failure of the hard left, and second, the consequent rise in
right-wing

thought

within

the

party.

The

center/right

coalition took control, witnessed by the defeat of Militant
and the Kinnock leadership's control of the party structure.
The reform of policy was similarly influenced by the new
factional control of the party, but equally significant was
the fact that Labour was responding to the Thatcher agenda.
Labour's new policy direction came from reaction rather than
proaction.
The Labour Party is in a position where it can stagger on
to the next general election,
opposition to the Conservatives.

and once again be the main
If the party is to return to

power, though, the leadership must be ready to act.

By the

end of 1992, John Smith and his team had made a far from
auspicious
government,

start.

Despite the turmoil within the Major

criticisms

already being heard.

from within the Labour Party were
During the first six months of his

leadership Smith had done little to inspire confidence.

As
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one Labour MP explained, "He gives the impression that all we
need to do is sit back and let the Tories lose the next
election.

The lesson of 1992 is that the Tories will bounce

back."189 In truth Smith needs to start acting now to define
Labour's own policy agenda.

He is acting under the misguided

belief that "the main reason Labour lost the April general
election was that Kinnock, and not Smith himself, was party
leader."190

He has slowed the pace of reform, rather than

accelerating it.

The government may be on the defensive over

economic policy but Labour still lacks a real alternative.
Once again Labour finds itself leading in opinion polls,
but voters may still not be willing to support Labour when it
counts— at the ballot box.191

The visionary policy changes

needed to lead Labour to victory are still not in sight.
Labour will continue to lead opinion polls, but without its
own radical policy agenda these will offer only false hope.
Labour must take a fresh initiative in setting the policy
agenda, no longer simply shadowing the Conservatives.

It

needs to present reforming initiatives, such as an industrial
policy

targeting

government

constitutional reform,

and

industry

cooperation

or

for example of the House of Lords.

Labour needs to capture the imagination of the electorate.

189 Labour MP, reported by Andrew Grice in The Sunday
Times. November 22nd 1992, p.11.
190 Andrew Grice, The Sunday Times. November 22nd, 1992.
191 See The Independent. December 13th, 1992, p.19.
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True socialists will not like the party becoming a moderate
version of the Conservatives, but to return to power this is
required.
The next general election in Britain, in all likelihood,
is still three or four years away.
involved in a long-term game.

Labour and John Smith are

However, as Neil Kinnock will

confirm,

reforming the Labour Party can only be a slow

process.

If he truly intends to win, John Smith must begin

playing now.

Belief in cosmetic changes will leave Smith and

Labour courting disaster.

Explaining away defeat without more

substantial changes, will leave the party facing the gravest
crisis of its history.

While Neil Kinnock may have reformed

the party and prepared the way for another,

in the way

Gorbachev did, John Smith can only be the party's savior by
returning it to power.
this savior is still out.

As with Boris Yeltsin, the jury on
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